Philosophy of education is the field of study that uses philosophical methods to study education. Textbooks and courses in philosophy of education may be organized around the branches of philosophy—for example, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy—or around centers of educational interest such as curriculum, pedagogy, or school structure. An organizational scheme that was popular fifty years ago—stressing broad philosophical schools of thought such as idealism, realism, and pragmatism—is rarely seen today. In its place, we see some works written from the perspective of critical theory, feminist philosophy, or postmodern philosophy. Philosophers of education in the United States today address questions of standards, accountability, equality, and testing as part of their analysis of school reform, but they also examine perennial issues such as the aims of education, democratic citizenship, and what constitutes the good life. Philosophy of education has a long history, and it is helpful to know something of that history before tackling contemporary work in the field.
Western philosophy of education begins with Socrates (469–399 BCE), whose ideas come to us through the writings of Plato. Socrates modeled the Socratic dialogue in which the teacher engages a student in a vigorous exploration of an important issue through a sequence of questions. The harms and benefits of the Socratic dialogue as a teaching method are still debated today.
Socrates also suggested a central place for self-knowledge in education—“Know thyself.” He argued that self-knowledge is essential to critical thinking, and many current writers agree with Socrates on this. But again the debate is ongoing, and some critics confuse education with self-knowledge with therapy or the mere promotion of self-esteem. Philosophers of education try to clear up such misunderstandings.
Education was a central concern for Plato (427–347 BCE) as he attempted to create an ideal state. He was particularly interested in the education of intellectually able young people who, as philosopher kings, would become the rulers of his republic. Plato rejected the notion of hereditary rulers and recommended that youngsters be evaluated early so that the most talented could be identified and appropriately educated for leadership. His recommendation that different forms of education be provided for children with different aptitudes (and different destinies) won the general approval of John Dewey, but Dewey criticized Plato’s prescription of just three different forms of education as too limited. Ideally, Dewey said, education should be tailored to each child’s interests. This debate continues today: Should all children have the same education? Should different courses of study be provided for children with different interests and/or talents? How should children be assigned to particular courses or tracks? How do we justify our decisions?
Aristotle (384–322 BCE), too, gave serious attention to problems of education. As one of the founders of an important approach to moral philosophy—virtue ethics—Aristotle was especially interested in the development of good character. His Nicomachean Ethics lays out a plan for moral education that, with minor changes, has remained influential for centuries. Indeed, many recommendations in today’s programs of character education can be traced to Aristotle.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) is another great philosopher who contributed significantly to philosophy of education. In Emile, he described the ideal education for boys: a child-centered education that would allow boys to learn primarily from interaction with objects and the natural environment. Rousseau aimed at an education suitable for free men, men who would become autonomous citizens and responsible heads of families in adult life.
His recommendations for education are often embraced by educators for both boys and girls but, in fact, Rousseau prescribed a highly restricted education for girls. Their entire education, Rousseau said, must direct them toward pleasing and serving men. Feminist philosophers today find Rousseau’s recommendations offensive, and there is a temptation to reject them entirely. However, without the misogynist recommendations for female education, Rousseau’s ideas have been widely adapted in forms of progressive education.
Dewey admired Rousseau’s plan to encourage intellectual development by building on students’ interests. Indeed, that idea is basic to Deweyan forms of progressive education. But Dewey challenged Rousseau’s claim that children are born good. As a thoroughgoing interactionist, Dewey believed that children are born with propensities for both good and evil and that education must play a significant role in healthy moral development.
Although space limitations prevent further discussion here, interested readers can find much relevant material on the periods between classical philosophy and Rousseau and, again, between Rousseau and the twenty-first century. Some names to check on: Thomas Aquinas, Peter Abelard, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Friedrich Froebel, Johann Friedrich Herbart, and Maria Montessori.
Approaches To Philosophy
Changes in philosophy of education are influenced by changes in philosophy as well as changes in the larger society. In the second half of the twentieth century, philosophy changed its emphasis from metaphysics (the philosophical study of the cosmos and reality) to analytic philosophy, and philosophy of education texts abandoned their earlier concentration on realism and idealism. Instead, philosophers of education undertook the careful analysis of educational concepts such as teaching, heuristics, knowledge and knowing, discovery, readiness, slogans, and indoctrination. The 1960s and 1970s were exciting years for analytic philosophers of education, and they often joined research teams, working to clarify the concepts central to various investigations. The strictest analytic philosophers followed the dictum of Ludwig Wittgenstein that philosophy properly “leaves everything as it is”; its job is simply to make everything clear.
Not everyone agreed with Wittgenstein on this. In contrast, Karl Marx had insisted that the whole point is to change the world, not to leave it as it is. In agreement, some philosophers of education took a Marxist approach in their writing. All philosophical work involves some analysis, but analytic philosophers confine themselves to analysis, whereas Marxist philosophers and many others take a particular perspective and often suggest an agenda for social change.
Another general approach, pragmatism (a school of thought that emphasizes the consequences of acts and concepts rather than their foundations in principles), has coexisted with analytic and Marxist philosophy.
Indeed, pragmatism was popular earlier as an alternative to the realism/idealism scheme, and it survived (as a “school”) beside analytic and Marxist philosophy. Most pragmatist work was built on the philosophy of John Dewey, but some draws as well on William James, C. S. Peirce, and C. I. Lewis. It is interesting to note that Dewey himself rarely used the term pragmatism, preferring instrumentalism or experimentalism. Today, many philosophers of education are heavily indebted to the pragmatic tradition, but few identify themselves specifically as pragmatists. Similarly, although most philosophers engage in analytic work, few limit themselves to clarification or even believe that it is possible to do so.
There have been changes also in the Marxist tradition. Some continue to write as neo-Marxists, but many more work in critical theory—a philosophical approach that concentrates on political, social, and economic struggles. Critical theorists sometimes draw on Marx but more often today on Antonio Gramsci, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Michel Foucault, and Jurgen Habermas. Critical theorists are particularly interested in the quest for human freedom and the social conditions underlying domination and oppression. In philosophy of education, Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed has been highly influential.
Critical theory is often thought of as part of Continental philosophy, and Continental philosophy is contrasted with analytic philosophy—especially with the British tradition. Another facet of Continental philosophy is existentialism. Existentialism includes a collection of thinkers (sometimes in conflict with one another) interested in the nature of being, meaning and absurdity, death, anxiety, relationships, and freedom. Some existentialists—for example, Jean-Paul Sartre—are frankly atheist, and their philosophy is influenced by their atheism. In it, we find themes of loneliness, alienation, anxiety, and absurdity but also freedom and responsibility. Other existentialist philosophers, such as Martin Buber and Søren Kierkegaard, are religious existentialists, and their concentration is often on relation and response. Not surprisingly, given their interest in life’s extreme situations, existentialist philosophers draw heavily on literature, and some are known for their fiction, plays, and poetry.
In education, Maxine Greene has used the work of Sartre on freedom, and her work has had an important influence on views of freedom in education. Nel Noddings (while rejecting the label “existentialist”) has drawn heavily on the work of Buber and applied it to relations and response in education as well as to feminist ethics. Just as analysis is part of all philosophical work, existential questions have been treated throughout the history of philosophy. They appear in Plato, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, Martin Heidegger, and Dewey, and they remain important today even for philosophers who do not call themselves existentialists. Educators who are alarmed by the apparent lack of meaning in today’s curriculum might profit from reading some existential philosophy.
Hermeneutics is another trend that should be mentioned in connection with Continental philosophy. Long associated with religious studies, hermeneutics— the practice of scholarly interpretation—has grown in popularity. As it has become clear that pure analytic philosophy may be an impossible dream—there is always a viewpoint or set of values from which analysis is launched—the enterprise of interpretation has become more acceptable in philosophy and philosophy of education. In current philosophy of education, we find work that interprets and reinterprets concepts found in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Dewey.
Possibly the most prominent school of thought associated with Continental philosophy is postmodernism. Postmodern philosophers, like existentialists, are not all of one mind, but they all challenge what they take to be the central tenets of modern philosophy— objectivity, “grand narratives” ( declarations of universality in human life), the possibility of autonomy, the legitimacy of power, and the rigidity of categories once thought to be biological, such as gender. Postmodern philosophy is not, however, merely destructive. The work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, for example, is emotionally powerful in treating the uniqueness of the Other—a plea for preservation of and respect for the living Other who cannot be completely subsumed under a universal category. Educators interested in current problems of diversity should find the writings of some postmodern philosophers useful.
Feminist philosophy has also influenced philosophers of education. One of the great contributions of feminist thought is its powerful criticism of traditional philosophy and its support for the subordination of women. Feminist philosophers may identify themselves methodologically with existentialism, postmodernism, critical theory, pragmatism, or analytic philosophy. Like all philosophers, they tend to work primarily in one branch of philosophy—epistemology, political philosophy, ethics, or philosophy of science— and within that branch on problems related to education and the liberation of women. In political philosophy, for example, they make take positions as liberal, socialist, Marxist, or radical feminists. They draw their methods from a tradition, but their purpose is to correct those methods in order to achieve justice for women.
Branches Of Philosophy
Epistemology (theory of knowledge) is a branch of philosophy closely associated with education. From the time of Socrates to the present day, philosophers have raised questions about the nature of knowledge, what it means to know, and how to define truth. Socrates argued that knowledge is stored in the immortal soul and is recovered and displayed through sound teaching methods; Rousseau asserted that children learn best through unfettered interaction with objects and the natural environment; Dewey argued that knowledge is built through interested experimentation, social interaction, and critical reflection. Many of today’s educators argue that all knowledge is constructed and that the mere memorization of facts is the weakest form of construction, resulting in a short-lived catalog of information subject to rapid decay.
Teachers have always been interested in the criteria by which we can judge whether or not a student really knows something. Those who lean toward a behaviorist view of learning make their judgment on the basis of accurate responses to specific stimuli. This approach is familiar in the widespread use of single answer tests which can answer the question, “Has Johnny learned X?” but, as Noam Chomsky pointed out, cannot answer the more complex question, “What has Johnny learned?” Answering that question requires open relationships, observation, and intelligent dialogue. Further, even on simple, single-response questions, students may answer correctly without being able to justify their answers.
We might insist that A should be credited with knowing that p (where p is a proposition) if and only if
A believes that p.
P is true.
A offers good reasons for believing that p.
This traditional test of knowing (justified true belief) is still widely accepted in education. Notice that this view implies that truth is a larger set than knowledge, and knowledge is that subset of truth that human beings have managed to acquire. If we accept this view, we are faced with questions about how truth is established, where it resides, and how people access it.
But there are other views. From Dewey’s perspective, for example, knowledge is bigger than truth, and anything that we use in our explorations can be called “knowledge” until it shows itself to be ineffective. That which continues to contribute to successful investigation, that which resists refutation, approaches the level of truth.
Present-day constructivists take a similar approach. Following Jean Piaget, they claim that all knowledge is constructed. Constructivist philosophers and teachers recommend that students test out their ideas in experimentation and discussion. The test of knowledge lies in application, not in rote response.
Clearly, this basic difference in epistemological orientation suggests major differences in curriculum and pedagogy. The “justified true belief” perspective often guides a curriculum that is almost entirely specified at the outset—a body of knowledge (already confirmed by experts) to be learned by students. The Deweyan and constructivist views lead more often to a larger role for what Philip Jackson has called the “interactive” curriculum—one built cooperatively by students and teachers as they work on topics and problems of mutual interest.
Few educators take a postmodern position, one that rejects the notion of truth and asserts that all knowledge is relative to the culture in which it is pronounced. A position very like this appears in the work of some philosophers of education who focus on multicultural education, “Whiteness” theory, and racial identity but, so far at least, the rejection of universal truth and knowledge has had little impact on the school curriculum. Whereas postmodern philosophy has led to increasing emphasis on the sociology of knowledge (as contrasted with epistemology), curricula on diversity and identity look very like traditional curricula with different topics. It should be noted, also, that philosophers of education often tackle these topics from perspectives other than the postmodern.
Epistemological topics are of special interest to philosophers interested in educational research. Hotly debated questions include: What is scientifically based research? Must such research be quantitative? Must it be experimental? Is pharmaceutical research a good model for educational research? Is there something ethically questionable in using randomized experiments in schools to try out various teaching methods? (Interested readers might consult the work of, for example, Gary Fenstermacher, D. C. Phillips, and Harvey Siegel.)
Philosophers of education interested in ethics usually approach the subject from one of several perspectives: the liberal tradition through Kant and Rawls; utilitarianism (e.g., John Stuart Mill); virtue ethics; or the ethics of care recently developed by feminist philosophers and psychologists. All of these views receive considerable attention in current philosophy of education.
Virtue ethics is enjoying a robust revival in the work of Martha Nussbaum and Michael Slote. In education, it serves as the theoretical framework for new programs in character education. Virtue ethics, in contrast to Kantian and utilitarian ethics, de-emphasizes moral principles and concentrates on the development of character and good motives. Caught in a moral dilemma, virtue ethicists ask, “What would a person of the best character do in this situation?” Accordingly, character educators emphasize the acquisition of virtues. In a debate echoing concerns as old as Socrates, philosophers still argue over whether and how virtues can be taught. Can they be taught, or are they somehow “caught”? What difference does this make in how we approach moral education?
Character education may be contrasted with the cognitive-developmental program based on the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg’s approach concentrates on moral reasoning, and teachers promote more powerful reasoning through the use of moral dilemmas. According to this scheme, moral growth occurs in stages, and the highest stage requires moral thinkers to apply principles of universal justice. The Kohlbergian approach has generated much empirical research (some of it cross-cultural) and also much debate. Its Kantian/Rawlsian emphasis on principles has been challenged. In a morally problematic situation, do people ask, “What moral principle should govern my decision?” or are they more likely to follow the customs of their moral community or moral leader as virtue ethicists contend? Some recent studies suggest that relatively few people use principles to guide their moral behavior; more often they obey the customs of their group or respond directly from sympathy or care. (Kohlbergian-Kantian-Rawlsian philosophers can still argue that people should use moral principles.)
Another challenge to Kohlberg came from the psychologist Carol Gilligan who argued that females may develop along a different (but morally sound) path— one that emphasizes caring and response rather than justice. Interest in care ethics has grown rapidly over the last two decades, and its influence can be found not only in philosophy and psychology but also in education, nursing, law, business, religion, and global ethics. A lively debate arose in philosophy of education over the primacy of justice (a Kantian approach) or caring. The debate is not closed, but most of the contenders recognize the need for both caring and justice. One important remaining question is this: Can justice be derived from caring or are the two concepts independent? (See the work of Kenneth Strike, Nel Noddings, Ann Diller, Barbara Houston, Barbara Thayer-Bacon, and Karl Hostetler.)
Just as philosophy of science is closely related to epistemology, political/social philosophy is closely related to ethics. It treats, among other topics, liberalism, democracy, equality, oppression and liberation, and problems of identity (racial, ethnic, gender, and religious). Possibly this branch of philosophy receives more attention today from philosophers of education than any other. Some such work is directed by the liberal tradition, and some is distinctly postmodern in its orientation. There are lively arguments over the adequacy of liberalism, the meaning of equality, democratic education, and the politics of recognition. Philosophers of education have been deeply involved in studies of multiculturalism, diversity, discrimination, domination, and identity. (See, for example, the work of Kenneth Howe, Walter Feinberg, Audrey Thompson, Eamonn Callan, and Lawrence Blum.)
Philosophical Themes In Education
Themes in education, like themes in most social enterprises, shift with changes in the social milieu, but some educational themes are perennial. They must be addressed conscientiously by every generation of citizens.
One such theme is the aims of education. Until quite recently, philosophers, educators, and policy makers seemed to take the discussion of educational aims seriously, and virtually every school prefaced its description of curriculum with a statement of aims. “Aims-talk” has been almost synonymous with philosophy of education. Today, fewer teacher preparation institutions require courses in philosophy of education, and policy makers seem to have settled on economic success as the aim of education—a decent income for individuals and economic success for the nation.
The history of aims-talk, however, is far richer. Philosophers have argued for broad aims in education: preparation for a good life, including personal, occupational, and public life. When we start with such broad aims, we must devote much time and effort to describing what we mean by the good life, how education is connected to occupational life, and what is meant by good citizenship. Each of these aims is necessarily colored by the times and cultures within which we live. When we talk about citizenship in the United States, for example, we are interested in how schools should prepare students for life in a liberal democracy. Because we are living in the twenty-first century, we must consider the possibility of global citizenship. What does it mean to be a global citizen, and will global citizenship enhance or reduce the status of national citizenship? Much current work in philosophy of education focuses on such questions.
Occupational life has always been a central interest in philosophy, but recommendations on preparation for occupational life have differed greatly. Some philosophers (including Plato) have recommended that children be prepared according to their talents for their probable destinies; education for artisans and workers should properly differ from that designed for the intellectually elite. Others (e.g., Mortimer Adler) have argued that all children should have exactly the same curriculum, one rich in the traditional disciplines. Still others (e.g., John Dewey) have argued that, within a common framework, actual learning objectives should be established cooperatively with each child. Differentiation should follow talents and interests.
Today, in reaction to the discriminatory practices that have arisen with tracking, many philosophers and policy makers demand an end to tracking, but only a few have examined carefully what this entails. Should all students study academic algebra and science? Why? Suppose many students fail these courses and quit school in discouragement and disgust? Should preparation for work and for college be exactly the same? What logic supports this recommendation?
There is an interesting new trend in educational thought exploring what might be meant by universal education. One meaning, of course, is simply to be sure that all children are enrolled in school. But in addition to this, in addition to basic literacy and numeracy, a defensible universal education would prepare students to work cooperatively in teams, communicate effectively, analyze and think critically, care for the natural world, establish healthy relationships and home life, continue learning, and remain flexible in the face of continuous change. What is interesting and promising about such goals is that they can be pursued within academic, vocational, or commercial courses. We can provide different courses of study, it is argued, and still work toward common goals. People in think tanks and global institutes are discussing the possibilities for this sort of universal education but, so far, only a few philosophers of education are studying it seriously.
The need for such an approach was recognized years ago by the prominent philosopher Alfred North Whitehead in his Aims of Education (1967). He criticized the traditional curriculum—one surprisingly like ours today—for its almost complete lack of connection to actual life, and he insisted that connections be made in both general and specialized courses. He also heaped scorn on the practice of depending heavily on external examinations to evaluate student learning.
Decades earlier (in 1918), the U.S. Department of Education’s Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education was published. It too recommended that school work be more closely aligned with real life. It listed as educational goals health, command of fundamental processes, worthy home membership, vocation, citizenship, worthy use of leisure, and ethical character. In breadth and tone, these aims are similar to those suggested by the new view of universal education.
Periodically, philosophers and educators have attempted to broaden the aims of education, but their efforts have met strong resistance. Why the resistance? This is in itself an important philosophical question. And will the current attempt to connect humanistic goals with economic goals overcome the resistance? Or is something deeply conservative operating here? There have always been, and still are, strong proponents of the traditional disciplinary curriculum. This academic curriculum was once thought to be appropriate only for the intellectually able students, those headed for college. Today, many argue—in the name of equality—that all students should have this curriculum. All should be prepared for college.
But in what sense do we achieve equality through sameness? Some philosophers argue that forcing all children to study the same curriculum ensures inequality. Children whose talents do not lie in the academic arena are doubly cheated: They do poorly in the required courses and are deprived of courses in which they might excel. For obvious reasons, equality is a concept getting much attention from philosophers.
One angle of attack on issues of equality concentrates on equality of opportunity. It is argued that equality of opportunity should be provided for all students. But this declaration raises crucial questions: Opportunity for what? What constitutes equal opportunity? Can the schools compensate for great inequalities that children bring with them from their homes? There are those who insist that equal opportunity can be defined in terms of a standard curriculum, high standards for all, and competent teaching. But, critics respond, children who come to school with toothaches and uncontrolled asthma, who have no one at home to help with homework, who live in dangerous neighborhoods—these children do not have an opportunity equal to that of wealthier children, and the school, by itself, cannot make the opportunities equal.
At bottom, we must ask the question: Equal opportunity for what? The answer today seems to be, for college. But, some philosophers argue, a better answer would be “to live a full, happy life.” If we respond this way, we are likely to suggest universal goals that are not tied to specific disciplines, nor to specific futures. Then we must ask how existing subject matter courses can contribute to these broader goals. We must find a way to accommodate the culturally specific, local, and personal within the overarching goals of universal education.
Preparation for democratic citizenship is another topic of central interest to philosophers. Those who follow John Dewey recommend that students be offered age-appropriate opportunities to make choices while they are in school—preparation to exercise a fundamental right in liberal societies. Opponents of Dewey’s recommendations insist that schooling should provide academic knowledge and skills which, in adulthood, will prove useful in democratic life. It is hard to imagine an intellectual disagreement that has resulted in more heated debate than this one. Deweyans claim that the traditionalists offer a tightly prescribed curriculum that is coercive and often meaningless. Traditionalists condemn progressive education for lack of rigor, disrespect for national icons and religion and, in general, for corruption of both the young and our system of education.
Even on the topic of choice—a bedrock concept in liberal democracies—philosophers in the United States often disagree. Some are sympathetic to forms of school choice that allow parents to send their children to private or parochial schools at public expense. Others, adamantly opposed to the use of public funds for religious schools of any sort, recommend more choice within the public system—especially the sort of student choice discussed above. Arguing that the public schools provide the very foundation of our democracy, these philosophers want to strengthen the schools by giving all children opportunities to pursue the universal goals mentioned earlier. Those in favor of school choice respond that it is more likely that children will attain these goals if they are allowed to escape the atmosphere of failure in many of our public schools.
The question of what constitutes failure or success also interests philosophers. No one doubts that many poor and minority children have been ill served by our public schools. Jonathan Kozol has described our neglect in poignant detail over the past forty years, but he has pointed to injustices in resources and attitudes. He has not concentrated directly on outcomes, as present critics do. Ideally, it seems right to insist that there should be no substantial differences among racial/ethnic/gender groups in achievement. But what produces these differences? If it is just a matter of conscientious teaching, then present critics are right to insist on high standards for all and “no excuses.” But the schools are not the only culpable institutions. Some philosophers suggest that the current school reform movement is, in part, an attempt to distract citizens from the massive social problems that must be solved if there is to be any real meaning to “equal opportunity.”
Then, too, there is a question about how achievement should be defined and measured. Should achievement be defined and evaluated entirely by scores on standardized tests? Are there no other criteria for achievement and satisfaction in schooling? Close on the heels of these questions come questions on how the achievement gap can be closed. On the assumption that achievement will be measured by test scores, are we justified in spending most of the school day on exercises designed to improve those scores? Is it acceptable to deprive poor children of art, music, social studies, and recess in order to maintain a focus on reading and mathematics? Is it morally acceptable to retain children in Grade 4 until they can pass the standardized tests on material designated for that grade? Should we worry about the emotional and intellectual effects of retention? Or is such treatment justified by the commitment to close the gap and give all children an equal opportunity?
These are among the important questions addressed today by philosophers of education. Readers should note, however, that current questions are closely related to perennial questions, among which are questions of aims: Why do we educate? How much of the curriculum should be common and how much differentiated by talent and interests? Can we create curricula that will provide for both universal and personal education? These are questions that must be considered anew by every generation.
- Adler, M. J. (1982). The paideia proposal. New York: Macmillan.
- Cahn, S. M. (1997). Classic and contemporary readings in the philosophy of education. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and education. New York: Macmillan.
- Dewey, J. (1963). Experience and education. New York: Collier Books. (Original work published 1938)
- Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed (M. Bergman Ramos, Trans.). New York: Continuum.
- Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Greene, M. (1988). The dialectic of freedom. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Jackson, P. (1966). The way teaching is. Washington, DC: National Education Association.
- Kohlberg, L. (1983). Moral stages: A current formulation and response to critics. Basel: Karger.
- Kozol, J. (1991). Savage inequalities: Children in America’s schools. New York: HarperCollins.
- Martin, J. R. (1985). Reclaiming a conversation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Noddings, N. (2003). Happiness and education. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Noddings, N. (2006). Philosophy of education (2nd ed.).
- Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Soltis, J. (1968). An introduction to the analysis of educational concepts. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Whitehead, A. N. (1967). The aims of education. New York: Free Press.
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