Alexander L. George Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

Alexander George (1920–2006) was an American political scientist and scholar of international relations. He saw the role of the political scientist in a democratic polity as that of scholar-advisor to the policy maker. He was particularly concerned about the origin of foreign policy crisis and the management of crisis abroad by democracies. At the heart of this management advice was international relations theory, which he differentiated in terms of substance and process.

Substantive theory encompassed mediation and dispute resolution, deterrence, détente, and crisis management. It was always tied to specific historical events such as the Korean War (1950–1953) or the termination of World War I (1914–1918). Motivation for the development of such theory stemmed from the practical desire to understand why wars started, how they ended, or whether important diplomatic signals were missed.

Process theory involved the attempt to improve the quality of foreign policy decision making. A central task was to identify “malfunctions” in decision making. George rejected the assumption that all decision making was necessarily rational. Moreover, process theory distinguished two kinds of decision-making rationality: technical rationality and value rationality. Normative considerations could, and sometimes might have to, enter into theory via process.

While at the Rand Corporation from 1948 to 1968, and later at Stanford University, George focused on an evaluation of deterrence theory and its operation during crises such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, during which the Soviet Union sought to place missile installations in Cuba during the cold war arms race. In 1975 he received the Bancroft Prize for the book Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (1974) that he coauthored with Richard Smoke.

George tackled the subtleties of concept with very precise language. Illustrative of this is his use of the term coercive diplomacy for the concept of “compellence” proposed by American economist Thomas Schelling. George preferred the notion of coercive diplomacy, because he believed that it preserved the distinction between offensive and defensive uses of coercive threat, a conceptual delineation that ultimately held great significance for strategic literature.

Deeply psychological, George’s analysis of decision making frequently employed case studies. He also offered a profound critique of structural realism. First, he argued that international relations theorist Kenneth Waltz’s reformulation of the understanding of realism as espoused by German-born American political scientist Hans Morgenthau was not a theory in the sense that it could be invalidated or refuted scientifically. Second, George claimed that structural realism ignored the asymmetry of motivation that often allowed weaker states to eclipse the greater power of a stronger state. Third, he noted that the greater scope of interests of the larger state, often proposed as a positive characteristic of great power diplomacy, was actually a liability, because it discouraged focus and concentration of resources to achieve a maximum payoff.

Instead of neorealist, game theoretical, or rational choice interpretations of international politics, George advocated a three-fold approach to strategic assessment. He believed that “generic knowledge” of strategy was necessary. A model of actor-specific behavior was also essential. Finally, an abstract conceptual model linked to policy makers’ judgment was no less crucial. All of this had to incorporate specific intelligence and information as well if it was to be of assistance to the policy maker. In the end, George was an influential voice favoring policy-relevant knowledge in international relations that would help prevent as well as manage foreign policy crises.

Bibliography:

George, Alexander L. Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993.
Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.
Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.
George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

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