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Appeasement is an influence strategy employed by states in relations with adversar ies. Most students of appeasement define it as a policy of easing tensions and avoiding war by eliminating an opponent’s grievances. Others, however, define it as a strategy of systematic concessions, and concessions are the means by which the strategy is implemented. Thus, terms frequently associated with appeasement include inducements, positive sanctions, conciliation, and accommodation. Appeasement may be considered a subcategory of engagement. The principal mechanism by which appeasement seeks to influence an opponent’s behavior is satiation—satisfying its hunger for land, status, or something else it values. But policy makers may also intend for appeasement to work through reassurance (convincing an insecure adversary that one’s own intentions are benign) or socialization (demonstrating the proper way to behave in international society).

Because it seeks to modify an adversary’s behavior through promises and rewards, rather than threats and punishments, appeasement is often regarded as the antithesis of, and an alternative to, deterrence. However, scholars have long recognized that coercive and noncoercive approaches can, and perhaps should, be combined in mixed influence strategies.

Why Do States Pursue Appeasement?

States pursue appeasement policies for a variety of reasons. In some cases, the objective may be short term or tactical—e.g., to conserve resources or buy time in order to rearm so that an adversary may be confronted more effectively. Appeasement may also serve to test the motives of a state whose intentions are ambiguous. In other cases, the goal may be strategic, such as to eliminate the possibility of war with an adversary, or even to transform a relationship from hostility to friendship. The pursuit of appeasement policies is frequently encouraged by the absence of a feasible alternative or by opposition to other options, domestically or internationally.

Does Appeasement Work?

Appeasement is often regarded as being futile and dangerous. It is considered to be futile because, it is believed, an adversary cannot be placated through concessions. Indeed, concessions are commonly thought to increase the adversary’s appetite for additional gains, leading it to make further demands. Appeasement is regarded as being dangerous because it allegedly undermines the credibility of deterrent threats. Accommodation of the adversary convinces it that the appeasing state is weak and irresolute. Should the state decide to stand firm and resist additional demands, its threats to defend its interests are not believed. Deterrence fails and war results. These concerns were central to the strategy of containment pursued by the United States during the cold war, motivating U.S. policy makers to vigorously counter efforts by the Soviet Union and other communist states to expand their influence.

The conventional wisdom regarding appeasement is derived mainly from the experience of Britain and France during the 1930s, when the leaders of those countries attempted unsuccessfully to avert a war with Nazi Germany. Many scholars have argued that Anglo-French conciliation of Germany—reflected particularly in the Munich Agreement of September 1938— caused Hitler to discount French and British promises to defend Poland, leading him to attack that country in September 1939. In a minority opinion, other scholars have disputed this interpretation. Arguing that Hitler regarded the outcome at Munich as a crushing defeat in which he himself shrank from the prospect of war, they contend that he found Anglo-French threats to defend Poland credible but, determined not to back down again, he decided to attack anyway. In some cases, appeasement has succeeded. Perhaps the most notable instance involves British conciliation of the United States after 1895; within a period of roughly a decade, the government of Great Britain was able to fundamentally transform the relationship between the two countries, not merely eliminating the possibility of an Anglo-United States war, but also securing diplomatic and strategic cooperation from the United States.

The success or failure of any effort at appeasement must be evaluated in terms of its objectives. Frequently, an appeasement policy has both minimum and maximum aims. Some may be attained, while others may not, so that the policy may be a partial success and a partial failure. Britain and France failed to prevent war with Nazi Germany, but according to some scholars, they did succeed in buying time for Britain to rearm. American efforts to avoid war with the Soviet Union during the latter stages of World War II (1939–1945) secured that goal, although the cost—Soviet domination of large portions of eastern and central Europe—was high and the U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the postwar world so desired by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt never materialized.

Why Does Appeasement Succeed Or Fail?

Factors important to determining whether appeasement succeeds or fails include the nature of the adversary, the inducements offered by the appeasing state and the adversary’s perception of them, and the presence or absence of other reasons for the adversary to respond favorably to the policy. Generally speaking, appeasement is most likely to succeed when the adversary’s aims are limited, when the adversary is motivated by insecurity rather than greed, when the concessions that are offered address the adversary’s concerns directly and fully, and when there exist other reasons—for example, domestic political pressures—for the adversary to accept the concessions and modify its behavior.

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