Civil-Military Relations Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

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Civil-military relations concern the interaction of the military and the state or, more broadly, between armed forces and society. The relationship between civil authority and the military has evolved along with the nature of states, societies, war, and the military profession, but the basic dilemma remains the same: ensuring protection by and from the armed forces.

The Military And The State

Modern polities are governed by states, which possess a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a defined territory to enforce its edicts on the population. The armed forces embody that monopoly and serve three primary purposes: external defense, internal security, and promotion of patriotism through indoctrination and provision of public goods.

Because states interact in a system in which one may use organized violence against another, external defense is the primary mission of the military. It is operated, trained, and equipped primarily for this purpose. In some states, the military also is used to maintain internal order, although this function tends to be assigned to other institutions as governments mature. Service of the population in the armed forces indirectly contributes to internal order as members are indoctrinated to serve the state. Goods provided to society by the military— including security, employment, and infrastructure—further promote the legitimacy of the state.

Yet, control over the means of coercion by a subset of the population poses a danger to the rest of the polity. The military may endanger the polity directly through predation upon society or indirectly by seizing control of civil authority, influencing civil authorities to provide more resources than required for external defense and internal security, or initiating conflict contrary to the interests of the state or polity as a whole. Imperial Japan saw the military directly control the government from 1926 to 1945, leading their state to conquest in Asia and ruin against the United States. Therefore, controlling the military is the central dilemma of civil-military relations, and most other issues, from institutional design to recruitment of personnel, derive from it.

Controlling The Military

States have developed a number of solutions to address this dilemma of military control by reducing the ability or the desire of the military to threaten the polity. With regard to reducing its ability, states have established institutions that divide or dilute the military’s powers, including multiple services, internal security forces, parallel chains of command, a cadre-reserve structure, and reliance on citizen soldiers. The United States has utilized all of these to ensure civil control over the military. States have also forgone training and educating their military personnel in ways that would increase the military’s ability to threaten or influence the polity, such as training in urban warfare or education in matters of governance. Finally, some polities have emulated ancient Rome and physically separated military forces from political centers so as to limit opportunities to influence civil authority.

States also reduce the military’s desire to endanger the polity. Many states have ensured that their militaries are well resourced and the leadership well paid and accorded status among the state’s elites. Most states have also established procedures that encourage convergent preferences between civil authority and the military. Primary among these has been indoctrination to ensure loyalty to the political system or government. This task has been eased over time by the prevalence of nationalism and patriotism in modern societies, which inculcate general loyalty to the society and state respectively among the citizenry, including those who enter military service. States have also used selection criteria to guarantee a convergence of interests between the political leadership and military personnel, particularly the officer corps. Historically, accession has been based on class membership, religious beliefs, political views, and merit with criteria varying with the nature of the polity’s elite. Throughout modern Europe, only nobles could serve as officers until Prussia eliminated this requirement in 1808, beginning the process of professionalization in Western militaries.

Civil Control And The Military Profession

The professionalization of the military deserves special attention, as it has been a key determinant of the quality of civil military relations. As states have matured, their constituent institutions have become more professional: merit-based entry and promotion, specialized work, bureaucratized organization, and the impersonal performance of duties. The military, the officer corps especially, has been at the forefront of this trend. Military members can make a career of their service, are given a degree of autonomy to perfect their expertise in the application and management of organized violence, share a corporate identity, and inculcate a self-image of apolitical service to the polity. These qualities have significantly shaped civil-military relations. At times, professional militaries have implemented ruinous civilian policies, as in Nazi Germany. In states such as Turkey and Pakistan, the military is professional but political and intervenes regularly in civil affairs, delimiting the policies that can be pursued, while in yet others, such as Honduras or Thailand, the military intervenes occasionally to remove civilian leaders it deems corrupt or inept.

The delegation of authority from the state’s leadership to the military requires monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to guard against insubordinate behavior. The extent of oversight and enforcement should vary with the congruence of preferences between the civil authority and the military. It is generally argued that a professional military will inherently comply with the preferences of civil authorities and requires minimal oversight. Moreover, it is argued that civilian involvement in the military’s sphere, in terms of monitoring or providing guidance below the level of policy, degrades military effectiveness and provides incentives for military involvement in politics.

Unfortunately, delineating the military’s sphere is precisely the issue. Advances in the means of warfare that have increased the distance, speed, and lethality with which violence can be applied drove the development of the military profession and have expanded the areas in which military professionals must be proficient to include national security policy, diplomacy, state-building, and governance associated with military operations. But this expansion goes both ways. It has been argued that civilian involvement is required at all levels of activity to integrate military means with political purposes even with a professional military. Thus changes in warfare have resulted in friction between civil and military authorities on substantive and process issues, including who should make what decisions, and suggests that the parameters of the relationship will continue to evolve.

Finally, a recent challenge to the military’s sphere has been the trend toward utilizing private armed forces in lieu of the military to perform tasks central to achieving state ends. It suggests that civil authorities are redefining the forms that its monopoly over the legitimate use of force may take—potentially to the detriment of the military.

Civil-military relations are central to the stability and quality of governance in polities, their propensity to utilize force internationally and domestically, the quality of the military strategies pursued to achieve diplomatic ends, and ultimately the nature and stability of international relations.

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