Détente Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

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Détente, a French term meaning “the easing of strained relations,” was used by Henry Kissinger to describe the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations’ (1969–1977) goals for American-Soviet relations. Détente would result from a revised foreign policy that recognized the limitations of American power; addressed relations with other countries based upon their foreign policy behavior rather than their ideology, domestic institutions, or treatment of their citizens; and attempted to entwine the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in the Western-dominated international order. In short, America would engage its adversaries unsentimentally and privilege international stability over the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad to reduce tensions.

Détente’s architects recognized that the Soviet Union had achieved rough parity in strategic nuclear capabilities while retaining a quantitative advantage in conventional military forces, yet its leaders craved recognition as equals, required trade and credit from Western countries, and were becoming estranged from their Chinese allies. The United States desired the Soviet Union to halt its military buildup, recognize Western rights in Berlin, facilitate American withdrawal from Vietnam, and establish principles for managing conflicts in the third world. The Nixon and Ford administrations engaged the Soviet Union in substantive negotiations that addressed these issues simultaneously, linking progress in one area with progress in others so as to maximize leverage and generate qualitative changes in East-West relations.

Détente achieved many of its goals. The United States and Soviet Union concluded two strategic nuclear arms control agreements: The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) froze the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for five years, and the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited each country to two batteries of 100 defensive missiles (soon reduced to one) deployed to protect their national capitals or an ICBM field. An agreement effectively tying West Berlin to the Federal Republic of Germany and guaranteeing western access removed a constant irritant from East-West relations. The parallel warming of relations with both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China facilitated American withdrawal from the Vietnam War and reset the geopolitical stage for American foreign policy. And Nixon’s official visits to Moscow and Peking, firsts for an American president, were symbolic of—and drove—superpower cooperation.

Détente did not secure lasting cooperation, however. Domestic critics, such as Senator Henry Jackson, emphasized the concessions granted in these agreements, downplayed the benefits, and demanded better terms while also rejecting the notion that the United States should negotiate with a totalitarian enemy without explicitly linking progress on international issues to changes in the treatment of its citizens. Such pressure for increased demands, along with the loss of presidential power caused by the Watergate scandal, Nixon’s resignation, and subsequent legislation, eviscerated the ability of the executive to threaten sanctions or promise inducements in its dealings with the Soviets and thereby undermined détente. Although presidents Ford and Carter continued the policy, seeking further arms control agreements and the atmospherics of superpower summitry, U.S.–Soviet relations soured. The Soviet Union took advantage of the situation by promoting third world allies, culminating with its deployment of Soviet forces to support its client in Afghanistan in 1979, which effectively ended the policy of détente.

Bibliography:

Cleva, Gregory D. Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1989.
Froman, Michael. The Development of the Idea of Détente. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.
Nelson, Keith. The Making of Détente. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.