Humanitarian Intervention Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

By the end of the twentieth century, humanitarian intervention had become one of the most controversial issues in the debate on international relations and foreign policy. It entails forced intervention in the territory of another state in the name of humanitarian aid or humanity. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a shift in paradigm occurred from the right to intervene to the duty to protect. The U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2002 illustrates this shift to “duty to protect” as part of U.S. efforts in the global war on terrorism to prevent further threats and attacks such as those against the United States on September 11, 2001, which killed nearly three thousand people.

One example that exemplifies both the right to intervene and the duty to protect is Kosovo. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mounted a military intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999 in response to the Yugoslav government’s violent actions against ethnic Albanian citizens in Kosovo, a region where many residents desired independence from the central government. Thousands fled as a result of the central government’s crackdown. NATO justified its involvement on behalf of Kosovars on humanitarian grounds, and in 2001 a United Nations–supervised Supreme Court in Kosovo’s capital of Pristina confirmed that war crimes and crimes against humanity had occurred, including systematic campaigns of murder and rape. NATO’s military action was the first of its kind against a sovereign state, and still remains controversial. Some countries, such as Russia, India, and China, claim that NATO’s involvement violated both Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and the United Nations Charter, while others have noted that such interventions are based more on national interests than actual humanitarian grounds.

Questions concerning humanitarian intervention include: How can a democratic country legally attack another country or invade a sovereign state? Is humanitarian intervention a right or a duty? What is the credibility of the United Nations (UN) if a group of countries are able to usurp the power to intervene in the name of humanitarianism? How humanitarian is humanitarian intervention? What are the politics, economics, and ethics behind humanitarianism?

In post–cold war politics, Western Europe and the United States have engaged in humanitarian interventions in Somalia (1992–1995), Haiti (1994), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Iraq (2002). Such interventions have been multilateral and based on cooperation among various governments on the basis of short and long-term goals. Humanitarian interventions, however, have never been purely humanitarian and can be explained both in terms of idealism and realism. In the debate over humanitarian intervention, moral questions cannot be divorced from political, strategic, and prudential questions.

The normative perspective usually found in contemporary literature on humanitarian intervention is based on international law and rights, but many political and ethical issues are automatically involved in any discussions on humanitarian interventions or human rights. For instance, the UN policies in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 were criticized for being too slow to act militarily and failing to prevent the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica, where over seven thousand males were killed despite the town being in a declared UN safe area and the nearby presence of UN peacekeepers. In this case, the United Nations waited too long to take sides in the conflict, yet by taking sides with one of the aggrieved parties, the issue of humanitarian intervention is likely to become politicized. In the absence of coherent international legal order, law cannot provide the sole basis for humanitarian intervention. It must instead be found in ethics, which can be highly subjective.

No intervention can be considered “just” or “humanitarian” unless it is supplemented with the right authority, just cause, and right intention. Moreover, it should be used only as the last resort. The question of right authority is crucial to the debate on humanitarian intervention because the very decision to intervene contravenes a state’s claim to sovereignty. It may be justified only in those cases in which the government agrees to accept the UN peacekeeping forces or in those cases in which the states might have “failed.” However, it is not easy to legitimize humanitarian intervention in all such cases. For instance, the Israeli interventions in Lebanon in 2006 cannot be legitimized under the failed state dictum.

All sovereign states have the right to decide matters within their own territorial jurisdiction. Both the formal notion of sovereignty and the correlative norm of noninterference have been accorded legal expression under the international law. Article 2, section 4 of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force between the states and Article 2, section 7 prohibits the UN from intervening into matters falling within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state. Exceptions arise only if the state’s actions become threatening and actually breach peace.

The problem occurs when it becomes imperative to overwrite a state’s sovereignty to protect the human rights of its citizens. In contemporary international relations, there exist three different models of sovereignty that vary considerably over the importance of state rights versus human rights, authority of the state to protect human rights, and the need to conceive an international system to protect human rights. The models correspond to the three most generally accepted traditions of international theory—the Machiavellian tradition, the international tradition, and the cosmopolitan tradition.

Humanitarian Intervention And Sovereignty

Under the Machiavellian tradition, human rights are considered the prime responsibility of the sovereign state with no scope for humanitarian intervention for the other states. Under this tradition, statism remains the most appropriate model of world politics and stronger states may coerce the weaker states. Under this tradition, intervention occurs only to enhance one’s power and not to protect human rights per se. The basis for intervention lies in the ability to intervene and not in the right to do so.

Those who empathize with the victims of war or the victims of human rights abuse on a massive scale reject the traditional approach to humanitarian intervention. Proponents of this second model insist on adopting the tradition of internationalism to regulate interstate relations and allow humanitarian intervention in rare cases. For instance, the 1951 UN Genocide Convention establishes a right to forcible humanitarian intervention with the UN’s authorization on the grounds that repression and cruelty on a large scale can pose threats to international peace and security.

Under the third model, sovereignty of the state is seen in cosmopolitan tradition. It amounts to sovereignty of the people rather than the sovereignty of the sovereign. According to this model, the sovereignty of the state can be violated not only by outside forces but also by the indigenous use of force. For instance, Chinese sovereignty of the people was violated by the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, in which the central government engaged in a violent crackdown against peaceful student protestors. In such cases, sovereignty can be restored both by international and national powers. Such a viewpoint provides justification for humanitarian action against pariah states such as apartheid South Africa, targeted by many nations for social and economic boycotts.

Although the international and cosmopolitan traditions provide legitimacy to humanitarian intervention, they are unable to authorize agents for such an intervention. The agents could be the United Nations, the European Union (EU), NATO, or any state in its single capacity. Nevertheless, larger states cannot be allowed to resort to humanitarian intervention to serve their own self-interests. Their “moral anger” also cannot provide just cause for military intervention. For intervention to be just, the intention must also be just.

The notion of just cause excludes, among other things, motives based on self-interest—profit, power, or glory. For instance, the French intervention in Rwanda in 1994 met with widespread dissatisfaction, primarily because it was perceived as motivated more by the continued desire to play the great power game in central Africa than by humanitarian concerns. It can be quite difficult, if not impossible, to draw a neat line between humanitarian and political concerns or between rhetoric and actions. As such, humanitarianism cannot and should not be allowed to be used to justify “unacceptable” or “self-interest based” interventions.

Inconsistent and arbitrary judgments about humanitarian interventions further complicate the matter. Inconsistency and selectivity with regard to the practice of humanitarian intervention makes motives highly questionable. Since the UN, EU, or NATO cannot intervene in every case, it becomes important to establish criteria for when to intervene and when not to intervene. This poses a significant challenge. If humanitarian concerns are to be measured in terms of number of deaths and genocidal campaigns, then Sudan, Liberia, and East Timor have a better claim for humanitarian intervention than Bosnia.

In fact, it is very difficult to arrive at some consensus on acceptable motives focused on preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement as far as humanitarian intervention is concerned. While many scholars have criticized the UN intervention in Bosnia, there is no dearth of scholars who have opined that the UN should have intervened earlier to save lives and avert catastrophe. Despite some support for earlier intervention in crises, it is important to remember that misguided decisions and calculations can also prove costly in terms of both politics and economics. The costs of failure of a humanitarian intervention may prove too high in the long run. It is better to adopt the criteria of proportionality, and reasonable hope of success, to serve as adequate warnings against indiscriminate use of military intervention in the name of humanitarianism.

Military Intervention Or Humanitarian Intervention

U.S. president George W. Bush’s intervention in Iraq, allegedly to prevent the nation from using weapons of mass destruction and to liberate its citizens from a dictator—thus bringing about democracy—discredited humanitarian intervention around the globe. The humanitarian arguments for invading Iraq met with severe criticism when the weapons of mass destruction the United States insisted were present—and had built a coalition of allies to assist in containing the threat—were never found. In many cases, humanitarian interventions have not resulted in humanitarian outcomes. British philosopher John Stuart Mill ably summarized in On Liberty (1859):

The disputed question is that of interfering in the regulation of another country’s concerns; the question whether a nation is justified in taking part, on either side, in the civil wars or party contests of another: and chiefly, whether it may justifiably aid the people of another country in struggling for liberty; or may impose on a country any particular government or institutions, either as being best for the country itself, or as necessary for the security of its neighbours.

Mill did not support intervention by those governments that tried to oppress an uprising of their own citizens. To Mill, “A government which needs foreign support to enforce obedience from its own citizens is one which ought not to exist.” He further added that intervention could be recommended provided it gave people freedom, but he also asserted that freedom bestowed on people from others cannot be real and permanent. People have to be their own vanguard.

In contemporary times, the question arises: is humanitarian intervention morally imperative? This debate took a sharp turn when a cyclone hit Myanmar in May 2008, killing tens of thousands of people. The junta in Myanmar could not provide immediate relief to its own people, yet refused international aid as a threat to its sovereignty. Whereas France was of the opinion that the United Nations should invoke the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in the case of Myanmar’s natural disaster, allowing for intervention, Russia, China, and South Africa disagreed. The latter opined that it was the responsibility of the states concerned to protect their populations in the event of a natural disaster.

While the 2001 R2P report included “overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened,” there are many scholars who believe that natural disasters should not be politicized and that they should be excluded from R2P. Allowing intervention in such circumstances would arouse the suspicion of weaker states about the true motives of powerful states and their tactics. Weaker nations are usually afraid that dominant states might intend to bring about regime change without taking responsibility toward their nation’s reconstruction.

Despite sovereignty concerns, many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are opening up to the idea of humanitarian intervention. For instance, in 2004, Indonesia’s Aceh province was worst hit by a tsunami and the Indonesian government allowed international aid in the province, placed under martial law. Aceh was previously not accessible to most human rights groups, international reporters, or aid givers. Similarly, in 2005, the Pakistan government allowed access to international relief agencies in an earthquake-rocked area of the disputed region Kashmir, which divides India and Pakistan.

China too accepted international aid from the United States after an earthquake in Sichuan province in May 2008, despite a history of reluctance to accept such aid. Not all nations welcome humanitarian aid, such as India, which refused aid from other states after a 2004 tsunami and 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. While China’s earlier refusals of foreign aid were motivated by its desire to retain complete control over its population, India’s refusal was intended to illustrate its strength as an emerging economy and a world power that could effectively manage its own affairs.

In practice, humanitarian intervention, carried out by a coalition of nations, can prove too divisive. Despite the generous notions underlying humanitarian interventions—promotion of democracy; protection of human rights; provision of aid in the case of natural disasters; and the maintenance of peace, law, and order—accepting such aid may be seen as jeopardizing national sovereignty. Article 2.7 of the UN Charter forbids interference in “matters, which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Despite these concerns, humanitarian interventions continue over the years, such as in Congo (1964), the Dominican Republic (1965), East Pakistan (1971), Cambodia (1978), Tanzania (1979), Iraq (1991 and 2002), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), and Kosovo (1999).

It is impossible to separate humanitarian motives from the political ones or for those who provide aid to claim a neutral stance. Humanitarian intervention is often directed by some omnipotent states in the north toward weaker states in the south. It is difficult to think of a weaker state in a similar role. For instance, the United Kingdom associated itself with the global war on terrorism in Iraq in support of the United States and their mutual interests as hegemonic countries. However, the United Kingdom perhaps would not have taken such a similar step in the case of India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. Humanitarian intervention in the developed world may be perceived as mere propaganda on the part of the interveners.

Humanitarian interventions often create a problem of moral hazard. Since the causes of most conflicts and disasters are deep rooted and complex, it is hard to blame anyone in particular. If there is intervention from outside, chances are that it will be followed by retaliations from within. As such, humanitarian interventions may, in fact, increase conflictual situations instead of peacefully resolving them, though that is not to say they cannot help avoid mass atrocities or prevent further upheaval.

While international law and the United Nations provide some structure for humanitarian intervention, the surrounding debate continues. Contemporary concerns include: Can the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq be justified as humanitarian? What exactly is humanitarian intervention? When is intervention legitimate? What form should humanitarian intervention take? Should humanitarian intervention continue as it has been practiced since the end of the twentieth century? What is the relationship between social justice and individual rights in the era of globalization, privatization, and multiculturalism? No consensus exists as yet on any of these issues.

Military or “forced intervention” may or may not be part of humanitarian intervention. It definitely involves boldness and risk-taking behavior on the part of intruders, in addition to a deep sense of commitment. When considering whether intervention should occur, a nation or organization may grapple with the possibility of guilt as a crime of omission rather than that of commission. This possibility contributes to the international community’s sense of reluctance to intervene in the affairs of other countries. It is easier to resort to humanitarian aid in the case of natural disasters than to engage in military interventions in the case of genocide or ethnic cleansing.

Humanitarian aid focuses on the victims desperately in need of aid, whereas military interventions are guided by many other geopolitical factors, such as the relevance of the country in question to the rest of the world, regional stability, and the attitude of the major players. It is never an objective, unbiased, neutral, apolitical, or acultural step. There seems to be better acceptance of humanitarian interventions for crimes against humanity than those for natural disasters, since many other forms of interventions are possible for natural disasters beyond forcefully delivering humanitarian aid. Another position, however, maintains that there is no such thing as humanitarian intervention.

A true internationalist believes in equal rights for all. Under these ideals, the people of Zimbabwe should be rescued from Robert Mugabe and the citizens of Iraq should be rescued from Shia militias. Humanitarian intervention, for the true internationalist, would be both easy and noncontroversial. Humanitarian intervention can also be seen as a response to the Genovese syndrome, the phenomenon implying individual apathy, societal resilience, and governmental inability to deal with big emergencies.

Bibliography:

Bajoria, Jayshree. “The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention.” Council on Foreign Relations, June 12, 2008.
Blake, Michael. “Humanitarian Intervention and Reconstruction: Collateral Benefit.” A presentation at the Peace and Conflict Series, Concordia University, Montreal, January 24, 2005.
Crawford, Timothy W., and Alan J. Kuperman, eds. Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Hilpold, Peter. “Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal?” European Journal of International Law 12 (2002): 437–467.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859.

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