Interest Groups And Lobbies Essay

The study of interest groups lies at the intersection of many fields of political science, although it is commonly associated with democratic systems. American political science often associates interest group studies with the study of political participation, linking to the study of electoral politics, campaigns, and elections. Interest groups in the United States are commonly conceptualized as organizations outside government working to influence its policies. On the other hand, interest group studies linked to Europe or Japan become a form of political economy exploring linkages between state and society. Interest groups are generally assumed to be founded on or advocates for an economic interest, particularly in the neocorporatist tradition, which favors centralized unions and opposes liberal capitalism. In this view, interest groups act as partners in governance with the state and are likely to be involved in policy implementation as in policy formulation.

Although the meaning of interest groups remains ambiguous—whether it is preferable or inferior to be considered a pressure group, organized interest, state, or society—a large number of impressive studies offer contrasting insights into interest groups and their status among and influence on politics and government. The study of interest groups has inspired large bodies of literature in formal theory, especially on collective action, and in normative political theory, including most famously pluralism, the belief that power is and ought to be widely dispersed among numerous groups, all with a capacity to influence public policy. Since pluralism underscores the guiding principles for most democratic states, the presence and popularity of interest groups in a state tend to be most active within democratic models.

Interest Groups And Political Participation

For many, the phrase interest group still conjures up an image of an organization composed of individual citizens focused on advocating a particular subject or area of politics, such as the energy sector, the environment, abortion, or animal rights. When studying such interest groups, questions still arise as to the reasons why people join specific interest groups and the consequences of these groups on the political system.

Interest Group Formation And Maintenance

For nearly two hundred years, the reasons motivating people to join or not join interest groups has been the object of investigation. Nineteenth-century French political thinker and historian Alexis de Tocqueville famously argued Americans were unusually likely to join voluntary associations. In recent years, Robert D. Putnam, in his works Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993) and “Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America” (1995), expressed worry that Americans were losing this characteristic and as a result, social capital was declining. Theda Skocpol in contrast argued in his 1996 book Boomerang: Clinton’s Health Security Effort and the Turn against Government in U.S. Politics that voluntary organizations were related to current developments in the nature of the American state rather than a natural enthusiasm of Americans to join. James A. Curtis and colleagues linked high levels of participation in civic life in America to religiosity; in a fifteen-country study, they found Americans’ level of participation to be roughly equal to or less than the levels of citizens in other advanced industrial nations when religious memberships were removed.

Some of the most famous literature on interest groups seeks to explain the apparent lack of logical reasoning among members deciding to join such groups. Mancur Olson argued joining interest groups is irrational if an individual can enjoy the benefits they pursue whether or not the individual is a member. According to Olson in his 1965 work The Logic of Collective an individual to perceive support from a foundation(s) or the individualized benefit of simply belonging to an organization, which can provide satisfaction to the individual apart from the actual stated goals and objectives of the organization.

A focus on why individuals do or do not join interest groups may be misplaced. In many countries, interest group politics is dominated by organizations representing business and labor groups, which are recognized, legitimized, and encouraged by the state to serve as its partners in governance. As Robert Salisbury noted many years ago, “institutions” dominate interest group activities, and he was reinforced by other scholars stating interest group lobbying is carried out primarily by economic organizations. Action, interest groups must supply selective incentives limited to members to elicit and sustain membership. The most important application of Olson’s theory was the difficulty of forming interest groups that pursued widely dispersed, no excludable benefits, such as clean air or water, generally termed “public goods.” In consequence, pluralism seemed to be an unlikely platform to provide for the common good of a population and instead appeared to favor more concentrated, narrower interests that had a better chance of overcoming collective action problems. Essentially, individuals would be more incentivized to work collectively to promote their private interests rather than joining forces together to promote a widespread, ambiguous greater good. However, after Olson’s theories were published in 1965, there was a surge in the strength of public interest groups in the United States and globally, which exists to this day. Scholars such as Jack Walker and his students have suggested explanations for the surge in public interest group strength, which still fall in line with the essence of Olson’s argument. Walker argued against underestimating the weight of importance for

Interest Group Strategies: Participation In Elections

In the United States, interest groups have a long history of working in election campaigns to support candidates, favoring or sponsoring their causes. Labor unions have been particularly prominent in this regard, along with conservative interest groups such as the antiabortion group Right to Life and the gun owners’ group National Rifle Association, which have also been vigorous, highly visible national campaigners. There have been repeated U.S. governmental attempts to regulate interest groups’ campaigning involvement. As such, interest groups are prohibited from giving U.S. political candidates running for federal office money from their general funds, but they can raise earmarked funds through a separate political action committee (PAC) to distribute in limited amounts to candidates, amounting to US$5,000 per election. PAC spending is regulated by a federal agency to ensure appropriate candidate spending and prevent direct corporate, interest group, or lobby contributions to candidates. Research studies as to whether PAC financial contributions have changed votes in Congress have yielded mixed results, although they generally conclude PAC contributions do not deter mine voting outcomes in Congress. However, while political scientists are skeptical that monetary contributions buy votes in Congress, most believe they do facilitate access to policy makers.

Despite federal oversight, interest groups have found alternative means to funnel money to politicians, such as bundling together individual contributions such that they can readily exceed PAC limits, referred to as “soft money.” Campaign reforms in the United States in the past ten years—exemplified by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act)—have attempted to further regulate private campaign donations and corporate sponsorship of campaign advertisements. However, in 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court overturned campaign-financing laws related to corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and unions, allowing these entities to finance independent broadcasts for political candidates under the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment.

Similarly, interest group backing of campaign financing occurs in other countries. Labor unions have long been the primary source of finance for the British Labour Party, Britain’s democrat socialist political party, whereas businesses from certain industries were the traditional source of money for Britain’s Conservative Party. However, the limited scope for paid television commercials and availability of free television time to the parties have somewhat reduced the need for British political parties and candidates to raise money from external sources. Notably, with the rise of capital-intensive campaign costs, meaning opinion polling, focus groups, and so forth, political candidates could begin to seek additional funds.

Lobbying

As demonstrated by their engagement in political campaigns, most interest groups focus their energies in ways that maximize their chances of influencing policy in their states. Accordingly, when institutions gain power, they attract greater attention from interest groups. As such, the decision making of the European Union’s taking precedence over domestic member state policies has led to a dramatic growth in the amount of interest groups lobbying the European Union.

In states ruled by parliamentary systems—including Australia, Canada, India, Israel, Japan, South Africa, Turkey, and the United Kingdom—the overriding dominance of the executive body inevitably makes the executive the primary focus of interest groups, according to pioneering political scientists Samuel Beer and S. E. Finer. In contrast, the UK government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) explicitly committed itself to reducing the role of interest groups in policy making, trying to limit the administration’s contact frequency and closeness with the Trade Union Congress and the employers’ organization Confederation of British Industry. The Labour government led by Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997– 2007) took care not to reverse this change so as to continue trying to limit union influence in the government. Similarly in Japan, the relationship between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the general employers’ organization, known as the Keidanren, and trade associations was extremely close during the period of state economic growth from the 1950s to 1990.Thereafter, as this model of economic development faltered, the relationship faltered, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was reorganized.

The focus of U.S. interest groups on the U.S. Congress is so well known that some are still surprised that interest groups seek to influence other institutions as well. Since congressional committees generally comprise legislators whose constituencies are affected by the policies the committee adopts, then these legislators are often the targets of interest groups seeking to impose changes within constituencies. The combination of the power of congressional committees over agencies and the influence of interest groups on the legislators on the committees is often described as creating sub governments or iron triangles, three-sided relationships between legislators, agencies, and interest groups that lead public policy to be directed toward satisfying the interest group, not the public interest. In recent decades, the iron-triangle approach has diminished as interest groups use broader policy networks to veil their strategies and activities.

Separately, U.S. interest groups are not limited to lobbying only congressional committees and legislators, but as Joel Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman depict in their studies, interest groups are in regular and frequent contact with bureaucrats and political appointees within the U.S. executive branch, including the Office of the President or cabinet members. Interest groups have also been highly visible actors in some of the tumultuous legislative and executive confirmation fights over justice nominations to the Supreme Court. Gregory Caldeira and Jon Wright have shown that the filing of a large number of amicus curiae briefs makes it more likely that the Supreme Court will hear the case. In addition, interest groups often appeal through the court system, contesting regulations issued by agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration or the Environmental Protection Agency.

Determinants Of Group Strategies

With few exceptions, political scientists have been slow to analyze the determinants of interest group strategies. Kenneth Goldstein (1999) proposed analyzing the relevant differences between some interest groups in the United States that give large amounts to political campaigns and others that concentrate on grassroots efforts. Similarly, Wyn Grant (2000) pointed out that theorists should explain the different strategies employed by interest groups in the United Kingdom; some choose an insider strategy, developing strong relationships with government departments, while others prefer an outsider approach more likely to include protests. One explanation for these differences is that institutions shape specific interest groups—as well as being influenced by them. Interest groups in many countries—including democratic governments—have been sponsored and promoted by the government. Political funding/backing of an interest group will most likely determine the methods and degree of accessibility an interest group possesses and most likely predict the group’s popular support as interest groups are inevitably shaped by the character of the political institutions supporting them.

Interest Groups, Good Or Bad?

Most American studies on interest groups have been related to the political and scholarly debate about the U.S. implementation of pluralism, questioning whether power is widely dispersed among the competing interests that encompass and characterize American society. In this debate, arguments have pointed out the lack of specific important interests not being represented by the interest group system or conversely demonstrating particular interest groups—usually business associated—enjoy privileged status or power within the interest group system. Thus, these questions tend to reconcile the compatibility of the interest group system and democratic values.

Aside from the impact of interest groups on policy, impact on members is also examined. Tocqueville famously argued that groups could be training grounds for citizens, providing experience at a direct, more limited level of practices vital to democracy. Such groups have been credited with the capacity to counteract the lawlessness or anomie of mass society as well as moderate society’s dependence on the state. The development of groups providing a civil society that stands between the individual citizen and the state has been seen as a key part of a transition from totalitarian or authoritarian dictatorships to truly democratic societies. This aspect of theorizing about transitions draws in part on the Tocquevillian view that involvement in groups promotes social capital and the willingness of citizens to work with and trust each other.

There has been much discussion about whether the associational life of Western democracies has been declining as citizens watch more television and engage less with each other as referenced by Putnam. Less attention and oversight are paid to the nature and activities of the groups, therefore diminishing their capacity to provide the benefits social theorists hoped they would. Skocpol notes that most interest groups in the United States today are far from social reform–minded participatory organizations Tocqueville and others celebrated.

Bibliography:

1. Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman. Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981.
2. Aberbach, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman. In the Web of Politics:Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000.
3. Ansolabehere, Stephen, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder. “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 1 (2003): 105–130.
4. Austen-Smith, David, and John R.Wright. “Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying.” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (1996): 543–564.
5. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
6. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.
7. “Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics.” Journal of Politics 63, no. 4 (2001): 1191–1213.
8. “The Multiple Ambiguities of ‘Counteractive Lobbying.’” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (1996): 521–542.
9. Beer, Samuel H. British Politics in the Collectivist Age. New York: Knopf, 1965. Berry, Jeffery M. The Interest Group Society. 3d ed. New York: Longman, 1997.
10. The New Liberalism:The Rising Power of Citizen Groups. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999.
11. Caldeira, Gregory, and John R.Wright. “Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and United States Senate.” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 2 (1998): 499–523.
12. “Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review 82, no. 4 (1988): 1109–1127.
13. Cigler, Allan J., and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. Interest Group Politics. 6th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2002.
14. Coen, David. Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors and Policy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007.
15. Curtis, James E., Edward G. Grabb, and Douglas E. Baer. “Voluntary Association Membership in Fifteen Countries: A Comparative Analysis.” American Sociological Review 57, no. 2 (1992): 139–152.
16. Dahl, Robert A. Who Governs? New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961.
17. Encarnación, Omar G. “Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Spain.” Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 1 (2001): 53–79.
18. Finer, S. E. Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby in Great Britain. London: Pall Mall, 1958.
19. Goldstein, Kenneth M. Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
20. Grant,Wyn. Pressure Groups and British Politics. New York: St. Martin’s, 2000.
21. Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
22. Key,V. O. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York:Thomas Y. Crowell, 1942.
23. King, David C., and Jack L.Walker Jr. “The Provisions of Benefits by Interest Groups in the United States.” Journal of Politics 54, no. 2 (1992): 394–426.
24. Nownes, Anthony J., and Allan Cigler. “Public Interest Groups and the Road to Survival.” Polity 27, no. 3 (1995): 379–404.
25. Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.
26. Pempel,T. J. Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998.
27. Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.
28. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.
29. “Tuning In,Tuning Out:The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America.” PS: Political Science and Politics 28, no. 4 (1995): 664–683.
30. Salisbury, Robert H. “Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 78, no. 1 (1984): 64–76.
31. Samuels, Richard. The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987.
32. Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and John T.Tierney. Organized Interests and American Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1986.
33. Schmitter, Philippe C. “Neo-corporatism and the Consolidation of Neodemocracy.” In The Challenges of Theories on Democracy, edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
34. Skocpol,Theda. Boomerang: Clinton’s Health Security Effort and the Turn against Government in U.S. Politics. New York: Norton, 1996.
35. Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.
36. Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. First published 1835.
37. Vogel, David J. Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.
38. Walker, Jack L., Jr. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991.
39. “The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America.” American Political Science Review 77, no. 2 (1983): 390–406.
40. Wilson, Graham K. Interest Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990.
41. Wright, John. Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996.
42. “PACs, Contributions, and Roll Call: An Organizational Perspective.” American Political Science Review 79, no. 2 (1985): 400–414.

This example Interest Groups And Lobbies Essay is published for educational and informational purposes only. If you need a custom essay or research paper on this topic please use our writing services. EssayEmpire.com offers reliable custom essay writing services that can help you to receive high grades and impress your professors with the quality of each essay or research paper you hand in.

See also:

• How to Write a Political Science Essay
• Political Science Essay Topics
• Political Science Essay Examples

ORDER HIGH QUALITY CUSTOM PAPER

Always on-time

Plagiarism-Free

100% Confidentiality

FREE INQUIRY

ORDER NOW

Special offer!

GET 10% OFF WITH 24START DISCOUNT CODE