Iron Law Of Oligarchy Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

Iron law of oligarchy is a theory of organization first developed by German sociologist Robert Michels in his 1911 study of the German Social Democratic Party. According to the theory, no matter how democratic at the start, all forms of large-scale organizations—democratic or nondemocratic—eventually and inevitably lead to oligarchic governance with authoritarian and bureaucratic structures. Therefore, because of this iron law of oligarchy, any form of large organization is doomed to be dominated by a small, self-serving group of people.

Michels’s Theory In Context

The iron law of oligarchy, Michels argues, emerges from bureaucratic and technical necessities of modern times. Complex modern organizations cannot be run by the mass membership on a day-to-day basis. According to this theory, especially in large organizations, a small group of people is given the responsibility of decision making. Although, in theory, the leaders of the organization are subject to control of the mass members through delegate conferences and membership voting, in practice, under the iron law of oligarchy, the membership is too big and decision making too cumbersome for the mass membership to make most decisions. Therefore, because the success of the organization requires their expertise, leaders are able to consolidate and monopolize their power.

In his theory, Michels is heavily influenced by German sociologist Max Weber’s argument that the differentiation, and probably isolation, of an organizational elite from their rank and file was a product of the technical division of labor necessary in complex mass organizations. Nevertheless, Michels challenged Weber’s assumption that organizations would pursue official objectives in machinelike fashion by means of expert knowledge and bureaucratization. Rather, these individuals start using their power for their own interests instead of for serving the will of the people they represent. Michels advocated a second, subordinate law suggesting that, regardless of the purpose for which the organization is founded, preservation of the organization and its oligarchy will ultimately take precedence. For Michels, bureaucratization, centralization, and conservatism under oligarchic rule are inevitable ends for any organization. It is important to emphasize that the theory says nothing about the organization’s relations with external entities. It is concerned with the situations internal to any single organization.

Michels’s theory also assumes that bureaucracy and democracy do not mix. Accordingly, an autonomous and self-perpetuating leadership cadre is incompatible with true democracy. According to Michel, despite its democratic ideals and provisions for mass participation, the German Social Democratic Party in the early twentieth century is a good example of the inevitable process of bureaucratic conservatism. It is observed not only in leaders’ wishes to maintain their prestige and influence, but also in the careerism of the self-interested salaried officials in the same organizations. Even the most radical and socialist parties and labor unions, which strive for equality between all individuals, experience this disparity of power distribution and bureaucratic conservatism. Communist parties in the Soviet bloc during the cold war era also serve as good examples of bureaucratic conservatism in party organizations.

Another premise of the theory of the iron law of oligarchy is that elites gain the ability to co-opt dissent through control over patronage as well as the media. The ability of elites to gather power, Michels continues to argue, is also strengthened by what is called a mass psychology of leadership dependency. According to this psychological approach, the masses have a basic psychological tendency or need to be led. Michels’s

theories bear resemblance to other elitist theorists, such as Vilfredo Pareto, who mentions psychological and intellectual superiority obtained by elites in modern society; Gaetano Mosca, who characterizes elites as an organized minority; and Moisey Ostrogorski, who stresses the pathological tendencies of democratic mass parties toward bureaucratic-oligarchic organization. One possible flaw in Michels’s theory is its attempt to generalize to all parties and organizations a process observed in one particular case, the German Social Democratic Party. Another is the degree to which it depends on controversial psychological claims: the universality of leaders’ lust for power and of followers’ willingness to be led. It should be noted that Michels’s thought eventually led him to a strong commitment to fascism.

The Theory Since Michels

French thinker Maur ice Duverger, while staying faithful to Michels’s general view, uses a comparative approach that considers all types of parties and reaches the conclusion that the leadership of political parties tends naturally to assume an oligarchic form—an inner circle that is hard to penetrate. Duverger, however, stresses the extreme variability of the political party structure and challenges the theory of the iron law of oligarchy’s homogeneous view of party organizations.

In his analysis of the German Social Democratic Party, Carl Emil Schorske argues, in his 1955 book German Social Democracy, that conservatism, which Michels attributes to bureaucratization, in fact reflected the dominance of a faction representing a certain constituency. Accordingly, it is argued that factionalism rather than bureaucratization is the structural basis for the indispensability of certain party leaders. Samuel Eldersveld, in his 1964 book Political Parties:A Behavioral Analysis, also contrasts the theory of the iron law of oligarchy with what he calls “stratarchy” by saying that in party organizations, political power is not accumulated in the hands of a centralized elite power, but is diffused across different levels of the party. Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash Garner, in their 1987 article “Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change,” contend that oligarchy is only one possible outcome depending on the character of the leadership, the organizational structure, and membership participation.

Many other objections to the theory of the iron law of oligarchy can be cited, but it is especially important to observe the possibility of compatibility between modern organizations and the idea of institutional democracy, which Michels had denied. Accordingly, the contingent and plural nature of power in organizations should be emphasized as well. Judith Stephen Norris and Maurice Zeitlin noted that in industrial unions, where there was a history of insurgency from below against craft unionism, internal democracy and democratic communication between the leaders and members had been prevalent. Therefore, the history of industrial unions suggests that internal democratic structure with open communicative channels and discourse between leaders and members can prevent any oligarchic tendencies or developments in organizations. However, it is Michels’s contribution to organizational theory

that, under certain conditions—such as lack of communications and discourse between the leaders and members and the absence of democratic mechanisms that effectively hold the governing power accountable—there always exists a tendency for oligarchic ruling in any given organization.

Bibliography:

Albertoni, Ettore. Mosca and the Theory of Elitism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.
Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties:Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. Science Editions.Translated by Barbara North and Robert North. New York:Wiley, 1963.
Eldersveld, Samuel. Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, Skokie, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1964.
Michels, Roberts. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009.
Ostrogorsky, Moisey. Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties. Oxford: General Books, 2009.
Pareto,Vilfredo. The Mind and Society. Harcourt, Brace, 1935.
Schorske, Carl E. German Social Democracy, 1905–1917:The Development of the Great Schism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983
Stephen-Norms, Judith, and Maurice Zeitken. Talking Union. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996.
Zald, Mayer N., and Roberta Ash Garner. “Social Movement Organizations, Growth, Decay and Change.” In Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays. Edited by Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy. New Jersey:Transaction, 1987.

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