Opposition Politics Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

Opposition politics involves the various ways in which the opposition in a democratic legislature can influence what happens in government. In some countries, the opposition can influence legislation considerably, while in others the opposition is practically ineffectual. A strong opposition potentially prevents a government from realizing its first policy preference. While an opposition may not force a government to abandon its original proposal, a strong opposition can impose a more consensual legislative outcome. This reality challenges the conventional wisdom that the government always governs, while the opposition always opposes.

In parliamentary systems, in which the legislature and executive are fused, the executive offers bills that the legislature debates and amends before final voting. Presidential systems function somewhat differently, but the dynamics within the legislature, and their implications for opposition strength, should still be relevant and valid. The key difference is that the president in the presidential system still retains an important veto on legislation passed in parliament. For this reason, opposition parties in parliamentary systems can be especially important.

In a party-free and rules-free environment, the median preference of the legislature—the position that divides the group into two equal halves—will most likely be the final decision. Any deviation from this median creates an alternate majority. Modern legislatures, however, are neither party-free nor rules-free. Individuals are often organized in several competitive parties that compete for electoral votes based on various political ideologies. Parliaments also function according to prespecified procedures and structures. As a result, the median outcome for a decision is not automatic. There may be opportunities for parties whose preferences differ from the median to influence the final outcome.

Opposition Strength

Opposition parties can and may exercise influence during the legislative process when certain political and institutional conditions are met. The most important of these include greater levels of ideological polarization and party fragmentation (party-system factors) and the presence of several decentralized institutional resources that allow parties and individuals access to the content of policy—specifically legislative committees, a second house of parliament, agenda-setting capabilities, generous amendment procedures during floor debates, and the ability to introduce private member bills (institutional factors).

When these conditions are present, two nonstandard outcomes that deviate from the standard notion of parliamentary practice may result. The first occurs when the party system encourages bargaining among different parties or when institutional conditions give parties access to important and decisive decisional mechanisms. In such cases, parliament itself becomes an important actor in the policy process and bills face scrutiny before final acceptance. For example, extreme party fragmentation within parliament may encourage shifting majorities for certain issue areas. Smaller groups can offer alternative proposals and potentially sway an outcome. Coalition building thus involves bargaining and compromise. These interactions empower opposition parties because they may abandon or join new majorities. Furthermore, extreme ideological polarization within parliament may compel governments to fashion broad policies to reflect as many interests as possible because competing interests could alter or sabotage a bill. In highly polarized parliaments, bills representing a minority of interests could face competing majorities. For these reasons, legislative fragmentation and party polarization potentially challenge the straightforward use of majority rule.

There are also several institutional arrangements that provide opposition parties opportunities for policy influence. Committees are important arenas for policy debate where opposition parties can challenge government bills or offer alternatives. Bicameral systems are designed to provide additional assessment for government policy and opposition parties in the upper house may find additional opportunities to scrutinize government policy. Some parliaments grant political minorities important rights during the agenda-setting process. Furthermore, minority groups may be procedurally permitted to initiate referenda or to introduce amendments and private member bills.

These particular attributes of legislative life—political and institutional—may encourage opposition parties to participate in normal legislative affairs to secure policy benefits within the legislature. Under such conditions, governments may face three undesirable outcomes: the content of government-sponsored legislation becomes vulnerable to external influence, government bills do not get passed at all, or private member bills that contradict government priorities pass without government approval. When this happens, an opposition is strong. Opposition activity may thus sway the fate of government legislation.

The second nonstandard scenario occurs when the party system and particular institutional conditions discourage party unity within government parties. Strong opposition parties may emerge when government party leaders cannot control government party members in parliament. In the modern conception of parliamentary practice, party members are expected to vote along predetermined party mandates. Developing clear voting mandates for party members produces stability and enhances outcome predictability. But governments are not always assured systematic, stable majorities in parliament because not all government members vote with their party every time a vote is taken. When this occurs, the opposition has the potential to secure periodic policy benefits in the legislature. Once government party members are available for policy negotiation with opposition parties, the government cannot guarantee that its policy will pass unaltered in the legislature, and numerous policy options become viable. Governments again face three undesirable outcomes: government bills are either revised, blocked, or the new majority passes a motion of its own. The final option depends on the opposition’s willingness to compromise with rogue backbenchers from government parties to form a new, temporary majority for a particular policy benefit. In these cases, the opposition is also considered strong.

The amount of polarization and fragmentation in the party system and the presence of particular institutionalized rules and structures therefore combine to provide incentives for (1) opposition parties to participate directly in parliamentary affairs and (2) government party members to defect from party unity and align temporarily with the opposition. Both scenarios increase opposition strength in parliament.

Given these conditions, some opposition parties participate in normal legislative affairs rather than opposing the government at all times. In such cases, parliamentary roles are not simply predetermined by the occupants of the government and opposition or by the occupants of the government and legislature. Behavior and outcomes are not always predictable based on these roles alone. Specific attributes of the party system and specific institutional opportunities should be evaluated for a more complete picture of how legislatures function in a real-world setting.

Bibliography:

Blondel, Jean, et al. “Legislative Behaviour: Some Steps Towards a Crossnational Measurement.” Government and Opposition 5, no. 1 (1970): 67–85.
Dahl, Robert, ed. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966.
Döring, Herbert. Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.
King, Anthony. “Modes of Executive-legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1976): 11–34.
Longley, Lawrence D., and Reuven Y. Hazan. The Uneasy Relationships Between Parliamentary Members and Leaders. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
Strøm, Kaare. Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002.

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