Power Cycle Theory Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

Power cycle theory explains the evolution of systems structure and the concerns of statecraft, via the generalized cyclical dynamic of state rise and decline in relative power—the state power cycle. The theory discloses essential nonlinearities, or critical points, in the dynamic that affect government decisions about their foreign policy conduct. It explains how the actor and system go from normal periods of statecraft to rare intervals when structural undercurrents suddenly shift the trend on the state power cycle, shattering long-held expectations about future security and foreign policy and greatly increasing the probability of war or conflict.

Since its inception, power cycle theory has been replicated in numerous statistical studies. It provides a robust framework for causal analysis of international political behavior and a practical guide for policy makers assessing the ebb and flow of world power. Additionally, power cycle theory applies to analysis of the market power and behavior of the firm in international political economy.

Power cycle theory transformed the analytic understanding of the structural changes which fractured statecraft prior to World War I (1914–1918), undermining the thesis that Germany would have been master of Europe if it had not gone to war. During the years before the war, in the period of Germany’s greatest achievements in terms of absolute power growth, its meteoric rise in relative power abruptly ended and, by 1914, the structural undercurrents turned Germany onto the path of relative decline. Power cycle theory thus exposes the conflicting messages and disturbing surprises in the evolution of the power cycle that make adjustments to structural change so difficult.

The state power cycles evolve as part of a single dynamic that maps the structural trends of history. The principles of the power cycle explain how differential absolute growth sets the cycles in motion, creating a particular nonlinear pattern of change on each state’s relative power trajectory. For instance, a single state growing faster than the systemic norm will initiate change on power cycles throughout the system, altering the systemic norm and the competitive relationships reflected on each state’s power cycle trajectory.

When statespersons contemplate future change on a state power cycle, they form expectations regarding the state’s future security and foreign policy role. There are five critical points of sudden, unanticipated change at which the statespersons’ projected trend of relative power abruptly shifts, creating a crisis of foreign policy expectations. Each critical point on a state’s power cycle corresponds to a time in its experience when the tides of history shifted in the international system, calling into question its foreign policy outlook and future security. The five critical points are:

Birth throes of a major power: a lower turning point, beginning the state’s rise on its cycle.
Trauma of constrained ascendancy: an inflection point marking the shift from ever-increasing rise to ever decreasing rise.
Trauma of expectations foregone: an upper turning point, where the rising state peaks and enters decline.
Hopes and illusions of the second wind: an inflection point where accelerating decline begins to decelerate.
Throes of demise as a major power: a lower turning point where further decline is halted.

What happens at a critical point is a complete deviation from the trend of projected expectations. Competition for power share creates powerful undercurrents that contour structural change via these critical shifts in the trend on state power cycles. Even at the moment of a state’s greatest increase in absolute power, with its dynamism undiminished, the state may bump against the upper bound to relative growth and be pulled into relative decline by a much smaller but faster growing state. This tension holds large implications for the debate regarding absolute and relative gains.

Everything changes for the state and system when expectations regarding future security and role are shattered. Governments push and shove in these intervals of high uncertainty where the rules of the game are in flux and the stakes are so high, making wars of large magnitude, high intensity, and great duration statistically much more likely than in normal periods of statecraft, particularly for authoritarian governments. Empirical evidence confirms that a government tries to mitigate fears about security at a critical point by joining an alliance and forming bigger alliances. Militarized disputes, deterrence challenges, and an increased rate of deterrence failure are likewise much more probable in critical intervals.

This dilemma of peaceful change worsens since the role cycle lags behind the power cycle. As a state’s relative power increases, other governments refuse to adjust or the state postpones role gratification. As relative power declines, allies demand security and elites want to retain prestige, causing overextension for states that refuse to adapt. Power cycle theory proposes a dynamic equilibrium that matches strategies of opposition and balance, or of adaptation, to the trajectories of power change of potentially expansionist states.

Bibliography:

Chiu, Daniel Y. “International Alliances in the Power Cycle Theory of State Behavior.” International Political Science Review 24, no. 1 (2003): 123–136.
Doran, Charles F. “Economics, Philosophy of History, and the ‘Single Dynamic’ of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft.” International Political Science Review 24, no. 1 (2003): 13–49.
Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century’s End. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Doran, Charles F., and Wes Parsons. “War and the Cycle of Relative Power.” American Political Science Review 74, no. 4 (1980): 947–965.
Heim, Jacob L. “Tapping the Power of Structural Change: Power Cycle Theory as an Instrument in the Toolbox of National Security Thought.” SAIS Review 29 (2009): 113–127.
Houweling, Henk, and Jan G. Siccama. “Power Transitions and Critical Points as Predictors of Great Power War: Towards a Synthesis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 4 (1991): 642–658.
Inoguchi, Takashi. “Conclusion: Generating Equilibrium, Generating Power Cycles.” International Political Science Review 24, no. 1 (2003): 167–172.
James, Patrick, and Lui Hebron. “Great Powers, Cycles of Relative Capability and Crises in World Politics.” International Interactions 23, no. 2 (1997): 145–173.
Tessman, Brock F., and Steve Chan. “Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-power Deterrence.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 2 (2004): 131–153.

This example Power Cycle Theory Essay is published for educational and informational purposes only. If you need a custom essay or research paper on this topic please use our writing services. EssayEmpire.com offers reliable custom essay writing services that can help you to receive high grades and impress your professors with the quality of each essay or research paper you hand in.