The Spanish term presidencialismo is common throughout Latin America and refers to the concentration of political power in the office of the presidency. This fact of political life has several explanations. First, Spanish colonies were ruled for The Spanish term presidencialismo is common throughout Latin America and refers to the concentration of political power in the office of the presidency. This fact of political life has several explanations. First, Spanish colonies were ruled for more than three hundred years by absolute monarchs and highly centralized top-down hierarchical arrangements. Following the Wars of Independence in the early nineteenth century, politics was dominated by caudillo figures, or “strong men on horseback,” who seized power through strength of personality or ruthlessness, and who bent legislators and judges to their will. Competing sources of power were largely absent. As electoral politics began to take hold in the latter part of the nineteenth century, political parties were for the most part personalist vehicles for individual leaders seeking the presidency, not consistent policies or ideologies.
During the first few decades of the twentieth century, more and more Latin American countries experimented with electoral democracy, but this frequently meant semi democratic rule at best and sometimes harsh and brutal rule by presidents who cemented themselves in office through a variety of techniques, legal and illegal. Extreme personalist examples include Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay (1954–1989) and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic (1930–1961). Such presidents often wrote (or had written for them) constitutions that gave them considerable power, but the question of how long such a president could rule remained unclear. A military golpe de estado or coup was one way to terminate a president’s administration; another was constitutional proscription on immediate reelection, a legal device that had been used since the nineteenth century. But this period of experimentation came to an end starting in 1964 with a coup in Brazil that was followed by many others, until by the late 1970s only Colombia and Venezuela had civilian governments in South America.
Since the decade of the 1980s, all Latin American countries, except Cuba, have returned to electoral democratic rule, and the great majority did so under newly written constitutions. These documents in general carry on the tradition of a strong chief executive and give significant power to the president and, for the most part, much less to the legislature. As a rule, and there are many variations on this theme, presidents are given a great deal of formal and informal discretion; if they have a majority in the legislature, their power may be virtually unlimited. In addition, most Latin American constitutions give presidents the power to rule by decree; that is, they can issue laws when they wish to do so without consulting or the approval of the legislature.
There is considerable variation on the question of reelection. Some countries have strict no-reelection policies (e.g., Mexico); others allow it with an intervening term or two terms, while still others allow immediate reelection or reelection after an intervening term. A strong party can indeed be reelected time after time (e.g., again in Mexico from 1929–2000), but such dominance may be due more to party strength rather than a single individual. Whatever the case, these variations illustrate the tension between the tradition of a strong chief executive and the historical record of abuse of such strength.
Bibliography:
1. Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
2. Smith, Peter. Democracy in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.more than three hundred years by absolute monarchs and highly centralized top-down hierarchical arrangements. Following the Wars of Independence in the early nineteenth century, politics was dominated by caudillo figures, or “strong men on horseback,” who seized power through strength of personality or ruthlessness, and who bent legislators and judges to their will. Competing sources of power were largely absent. As electoral politics began to take hold in the latter part of the nineteenth century, political parties were for the most part personalist vehicles for individual leaders seeking the presidency, not consistent policies or ideologies.
During the first few decades of the twentieth century, more and more Latin American countries experimented with electoral democracy, but this frequently meant semi democratic rule at best and sometimes harsh and brutal rule by presidents who cemented themselves in office through a variety of techniques, legal and illegal. Extreme personalist examples include Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay (1954–1989) and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic (1930–1961). Such presidents often wrote (or had written for them) constitutions that gave them considerable power, but the question of how long such a president could rule remained unclear. A military golpe de estado or coup was one way to terminate a president’s administration; another was constitutional proscription on immediate reelection, a legal device that had been used since the nineteenth century. But this period of experimentation came to an end starting in 1964 with a coup in Brazil that was followed by many others, until by the late 1970s only Colombia and Venezuela had civilian governments in South America.
Since the decade of the 1980s, all Latin American countries, except Cuba, have returned to electoral democratic rule, and the great majority did so under newly written constitutions. These documents in general carry on the tradition of a strong chief executive and give significant power to the president and, for the most part, much less to the legislature. As a rule, and there are many variations on this theme, presidents are given a great deal of formal and informal discretion; if they have a majority in the legislature, their power may be virtually unlimited. In addition, most Latin American constitutions give presidents the power to rule by decree; that is, they can issue laws when they wish to do so without consulting or the approval of the legislature.
There is considerable variation on the question of reelection. Some countries have strict no-reelection policies (e.g., Mexico); others allow it with an intervening term or two terms, while still others allow immediate reelection or reelection after an intervening term. A strong party can indeed be reelected time after time (e.g., again in Mexico from 1929–2000), but such dominance may be due more to party strength rather than a single individual. Whatever the case, these variations illustrate the tension between the tradition of a strong chief executive and the historical record of abuse of such strength.
Bibliography:
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Smith, Peter. Democracy in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
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