Professional Lobbies Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

Lobbying might be defined as an attempt to influence the government decision-making process and to secure certain outcomes via individuals or firms (lobbyists) who act on behalf of a person or a special interest group. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars Congress from abridging the right of people “to petition the government for redress of grievances.” Thus, for Americans, lobbying in the broadest sense of the word is a fundamental legal right.

It is important to distinguish professional lobbying from other efforts to influence public policy. In the United States, professional lobbying firms, located in what is called the K Street corridor, are companies that various groups or firms, usually called special interest groups, hire to lobby.

Other efforts to influence public policy are performed by groups that do not fall under the legal designation of lobbying firms in the United States and the European Union (EU). These include advocacy groups, business groups, labor unions, and farmers’ organizations. Especially important in the United States are public policy research organizations, called think tanks, that are classed as nonprofit, nonpartisan, tax-exempt entities under section 501(c)3 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. Such groups by law are not allowed to lobby government, defined as calling explicitly for lawmakers to vote a certain way on legislation. But they are often funded by special interests groups—for example, labor unions or businesses. Such organizations can issue studies and reports, organize conferences and meetings, or have their scholars appear in the media to point out the advantages and disadvantages of particular government policies.

For many people, the word lobbying has a negative connotation. Many people picture special interest groups that act in some way that is opposed to the public good. For example, specific labor unions and companies might persuade policy makers to protect them from foreign competitors by imposing trade restrictions. Of course, one person’s special interest group is another person’s “deserving workers” or “crucial nation industry.”

A deeper insight into lobbying is summarized as concentrated benefits, diffused costs. A company might secure millions of dollars in extra profits and workers might secure millions in higher wages through trade barriers, but the costs of trade restrictions to any given consumer for some product might only be a few dollars. Thus, a given consumer won’t have the means or the incentive to lobby lawmakers for free trade, but a union or company would have both.

In such cases, the fact that governments have the authority to grant such favors is considered by many to be the root of this problem. But others would point out that lobbying is simply part of the competitive political process.

Measuring Lobbying

Lobbying can be difficult to measure because it often takes place precisely in “the lobby,” (i.e., behind the scenes and hidden from public scrutiny).The measuring problem is especially serious in connection with unregulated lobbying, which is the current state of affairs in the EU. Why, for example, do Chinese shoe producers face barriers to entry in the European market? Here, the responsible bureaucrat in the European Commission can collect information from the lobbyists of the shoe industry in southern Europe (who will argue in favor of protecting their own workplace) and from consumer organizations (who, in contrast, will argue in favor of the lowest possible shoe prices). In this way, the bureaucrat or the politician can obtain support to reach a solid basis for decision.

Still, the small groups (shoe producers) are more likely to hire a professional lobbyist and influence the political decision maker than the large groups (shoe consumers). Asymmetrical and nontransparent lobbying in favor of producers at the cost of consumers may explain the elaboration of distorting EU policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy in the EU.

In the absence of mandatory registration for lobbyists in Brussels, it is impossible to establish the actual number of professional lobbyists. The European Commission guesses that the number is around fifteen thousand, and acknowledges a need for formal regulation of the area.

In contrast, in the United States, where about thirty-five thousand professional lobbyists are currently registered, lobbying is far more transparent and measurable. The number of registered lobbyists in Washington, DC, has more than doubled since 2000 to more than 34,750 in 2005.

The Lobbying Disclosure Act was passed in 1995, replacing the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act from 1946. The point is that in the United States the representatives of many special interest groups are legally required to register, and they have to report their activities to the authorities every six months, including areas of their lobbying activities, bureaucrats contacted, names of employed lobbyists, and total lobbying expenses. The reports also must be available to the public. For example, a search on the energy giant Halliburton from Texas shows that it spent $250,000 on lobbying between January 1 and June 30, 2004, in connection with, among other things, asbestos legislation, promotion of power-related aspects in the ongoing World Trade Organization negotiations, and continued cooperation with the U.S. armed forces. Due to the strict regulation of lobbying in the United States, lobbyist activities are much more directly measurable there than in the EU.

The political arenas of the United States and the EU can be characterized as pluralistic systems with free competition among the lobbying groups. This is in stark contrast to the Scandinavian corporatist model, for example, with its formalized rules for incorporating all affected interests—both producers and consumers—in the decision-making processes. Rational producers may in fact prefer pure pluralism and free competition among lobbyists to corporatism, which automatically involves the consumer side as well.

Lobbying plays an important role in a pluralistic system, and it is crucial for any interest group to hire the best lobbyists and build a base in, for example, Washington, DC, or Brussels. We know that most interest groups represent producers. Approximately 70 percent of all lobbyists in Brussels represent producer groups. Ten percent of all lobbyists work for consumers and nonprofit interests, whereas the last 20 percent represent regions, cities, and international institutions.

Lobbying Strategies

Professional lobbyists for industries or companies may operate with at least six different types of strategies that they may apply according to the specific circumstances. The first and most aggressive strategy may be called the gunboat strategy, which uses all possible threats; e.g., if the lobbyists do not have their way production will be relocated to countries outside the country. At the same time, lobbyists may run tough media campaigns. The second strategy, called the Trojan horse, implies that the lobbyist succeeded in getting inside the walls and at close quarters with the decision makers. Through this close contact and dialogue, it is possible to reach a negotiated settlement. The third strategy, the good and the bad, is applied if other competing lobbyists are acting like roughnecks. Then there is an opportunity to act nice and friendly yourself and to establish trust. The fourth strategy, the dentist, is applied when a producer group does not like a bill. It may try and pull out the worst tooth first and then come back after the rest later on. The fifth strategy, the third party, indicates a reaching-out strategy to nongovernmental organizations and unions to find a compromise on a disputed issue. The sixth and final strategy, the donkey, is a mixture of carrot and stick approaches according to which producer groups seek to win over political decision makers by understanding their interests and offering economic or career wise reward or sanction; in the worst case, they try bribery.

In perspective, it is crucial to establish clear rules for lobbying in any country to ensure measurable and democratic control of how various professional lobbies influence political decision makers.

Bibliography:

Bache, Ian, and Stephen George. Politics in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. “The Road to Riches Is Called K Street.” Washington Post. June 22, 2005, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2005/06/21/AR2005062101632.html.
Commission of the European Union. “What Is the Transparency Initiative?” 2006, http://europa.eu.int/comm/commission_barroso/kallas/transparency_en.htm.
Svendsen, G.T. The Political Economy of the European Union. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2003.
Wesselius, Erik. 2005. “High Time to Regulate EU Lobbying.” Consumer Policy Review 1 (January/February): 13–18.

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