Quangos are quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations. The term quango was created in the 1970s to describe public bodies that conduct public functions but are not directly controlled by central government. The purpose of quangos is to allow experts to directly control policy-implementation processes. However, there is no clear and single definition of a quango and it is not unusual that definitions are disputed for political reasons. Quangos range across a vast number of types of bodies and policy areas, from the delivery of health care to managing parks or ensuring the roadworthiness of cars.
Quangos exist in some form in most political systems but with different nomenclatures. For example, in the United Kingdom, they are referred to as nondepartmental public bodies; in the Netherlands, they are independent administrative bodies, in Germany, they are known as federal agencies; and in the United States, they are independent agencies and regulatory commissions.
To some degree, before the development of the modern state, quango like bodies were often used for delivering public goods. All governments have had quasi-independent systems in some form or another from the East India Company— responsible for governing trade and the economy in India— to the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States—set up as part of Roosevelt’s New Deal program to encourage economic development in the region. However, it seems that quasi-autonomous bodies are growing in number and are seen by politicians as an effective way to either provide services or regulate the provision of services.
Quangos are attractive to government because they provide for flexibility in administration. Policy implementation can be devolved to experts or officials in regions who are able to make decisions on the basis of particular circumstances. Moreover, quangos allow experts to decide priorities and processes. The largest quangos in Britain, for example, tend to be health bodies that enable medical professionals and health service managers to make decisions about spending priorities according to their perceptions of the needs in their area. They also allow processes of delivery to operate outside of politically controlled local government. For example, in the 1980s, control over public housing in Britain shifted from local government to a quango, the Housing Corporation. Quangos also allow for governments to shift or avoid the blame for decisions. Politicians can use quangos either to distance themselves from difficult political decisions (i.e., ethical decisions around stem cell research) or to depoliticize certain issues (i.e., the regulation of utility prices such as gas and water).
The growth of quangos has also been linked to the notion of new public management. New public management, concerned with improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, leads to governments’ perception of quangos as a mechanism for delegating decision making to managers and removing it from the hands of politicians and bureaucrats. quangos have also been seen as a way to reduce the size of central government by contracting out services to bodies that are not directly controlled by the central state. New public management also emphasized privatization where possible. However, governments throughout the world have been keen to regulate privatized sectors; as a consequence, privatization has concurrently risen in regulatory bodies. For instance, in the United Kingdom, privatized security has grown significantly. As private security developed, the government established the Security Industry Authority to regulate private companies.
Despite the universal growth of quangos throughout the world, they are frequently subject to criticism. There are two main criticisms of quangos. First, they are seen as being unaccountable. It is often the case that quangos are not open to normal mechanisms of legislative scrutiny. Indeed, in the United States, quangos have sometimes been used to avoid congressional oversight and budget limitations. Therefore, while central government departments have clear and direct lines of accountability to legislatures, in the case of quangos, these can often be obscure and vary from body to body. In addition, quangos spend vast amounts of public funds and often there is a lack of clarity on how, where, and why this money is spent.
The second main criticism of quangos is their frequent association with patronage. Quango chief executives and boards are appointed, and not elected; consequently, there is considerable criticism that politicians use quango positions as rewards for political supporters. However, in most systems, there are rules governing appointments and often posts are unpaid.
Regardless of the problems associated with quangos, they are important mechanisms for delivering public goods and are thus likely to continue long term in most political systems.
Bibliography:
- Flinders, Matthew. Delegated Governance and the British State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Flinders, Matthew, Ian Harden, and David Marquand, eds. How to Make Quangos Democratic. London: Charter 88, 1997.
- Flinders, Matthew, and Martin J. Smith, eds. Quangos, Accountablity and Reform. London: Macmillan, 1999.
- Richards, David, and Martin J. Smith. Governance and Public Policy in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Verhoest, Koen, Guy Peters, Geert Bouckaert, and Bram Vershuere. “The Study of Organisational Autonomy: A Conceptual Review.” Public Administration and Development 24 no. 1 (2004): 101–118.
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