Race And Racism Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

Race and racism are terms with considerable political importance, yet they are more difficult to define than may appear at first blush. Over the past few centuries, the meaning— and manifestation—of both terms has undergone a gradual transformation. Race, initially seen as group-based differences rooted in biology, is now seen by most scholars as a social construction. Some even suggest that it will be impossible to sustain the concept of race much longer. Racism has undergone a similar change, transitioning from overt acts of race-based discrimination to more subtle forms of racial exclusion. For example, political scientists have expanded the definition of racism to include institutionally-based forms of discrimination in which the policies and practices of institutions, rather than the actions of specific individuals, function to maintain—or even exacerbate—racial inequalities. This has led to an era of what some refer to as color-blind racism or racism without racists. In essence, scholars from this tradition argue that racism can now operate on autopilot (i.e., without the active or willful intervention of individuals).

Race

The meaning of race has a storied and politically charged history. At the most basic level, race has traditionally been defined as group-based differences that are rooted in biology, often manifested by skin color (e.g., blacks, whites). This definition of race is to be contrasted with ethnicity, a term used to distinguish between people who come from different cultural backgrounds. That is, race is used to group people together who share a set of physical characteristics, while ethnicity is used to group people together who share a set of cultural practices such as language, religion, and history, to name a few. Oftentimes, however, race and ethnicity co-occur, thereby contributing to the confusion over the distinction made between the two. Nevertheless, because the traditional definition of race focuses on physical characteristics, most historical treatments of the term argue that race is an essential category whose meaning is inherent and unchangeable.

Though some political scientists and philosophers argue that race has manifested itself in one shape or another since the beginning of Western thought, most scholars now agree that the traditional conception of race became a dominant political force among western Europeans during the Enlightenment (i.e., in the eighteenth century). Prior to this, religion was seen as the most salient and politically meaningful social cleavage.

By the Enlightenment, however, an essentialist view of race had gained prominence. Specifically, theorists began proposing that there were distinct biological differences between people of different races. In practice, this ideology was used to separate people of western European ancestry from people of nonwestern European—especially African—ancestry.

The biological view of race was championed by many of the prominent social contract theorists of the Enlightenment. This list included, perhaps most notably, Immanuel Kant. In an essay written in 1775 titled Of the Different Human Races, Kant argued that race was an immutable characteristic that played an important role in determining intelligence. The view of race as a biologically determined entity quickly became the dominant mode of thought during this period and was used to justify the emerging slave trade. It also eventually provided the underlying ideology behind the notorious one-drop rule in the United States (i.e., that anyone with even a trace of African ancestry was considered to be a Negro). Similar essentialist views of race were used to justify discrimination against Irish immigrants during the mid-nineteenth century, as well as Italian and eastern European immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century. Moreover, the biological view of race became an important component of social Darwinism, as many late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars argued for a laissez-faire approach to social welfare based on the assumed unchangeable causes of inequality (e.g., the supposedly inherent racial differences in ability). In essence, social Darwinists argued that because differences in inequality were based on race (i.e., biology), government or other interventions would be futile.

The view of race as an essential (i.e., biologically-based) distinction has maintained its prominence in popular parlance. In fact, the Oxford English Dictionary defines race as “each of the major divisions of humankind, having distinct physical characteristics” (emphasis added). Other modern-day examples of the essentialist view of race include Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s controversial book, The Bell Curve (1994). In this book, the authors claim that racial differences in intelligence may be partly due to biology. Though the authors’ claims were met with harsh criticism, the concept of race itself continues to be seen by many as an essential—and therefore immutable—social category.

Political science and other academic fields have steadily moved away from an essentialist view of race. Specifically, scholars within the social constructionist tradition argue that race is best conceptualized as the product of social forces rather than inherent biological differences. That is, racial distinctions are believed to be based on an arbitrary set of physical characteristics that, under different social and historical conditions, would manifest themselves in a different set of physical characteristics. In the United States during the 1800s, Irish and Italian immigrants were thought of as being racially distinct from western Europeans. Over time, however, Irish and Italian immigrants began to be incorporated into popular conceptions of whiteness. This suggests that racial boundaries are more fluid than implied by the essentialist view of race.

More direct attacks against the essentialist view of race have come from an unlikely source: namely, the biological sciences. Specifically, recent advances in genetic testing have allowed geneticists to study the human genome in detail. Contrary to what the essentialist view of race would predict, there do not appear to be specific genetic markers that are unique to one race. That is, scientists have yet to find a “racial gene” that exists in one race, but not another. As such, it is difficult to sustain the argument that race is determined by biology. This adds considerable weight to the social constructionists’ view that the concept of race has no objective biological foundation. Rather, social and historical forces appear to shape the meaning and interpretation of race.

Social constructionists argue that race is created through various racial projects in which the signifiers of race (e.g., skin color) are shaped by the given historical context. Specifically, various sets of physical characteristics are identified and used to differentiate between the “racial” groups in different societies. Over time, these signifiers become entrenched in the ideology of the ruling class and emerge as common sense. That is, race eventually becomes a concept that is taken for granted and seen as intuitive by each society. In essence, social constructionists argue that the physical characteristics used to signify race are not intrinsically linked to the social meaning that becomes attached to them.

There are also alternative views regarding the importance of race within the social constructionist tradition. In particular, some Marxist scholars suggest that, while race is a social construction, it is merely an ideological tool used to further the interests of the ruling class. Specifically, they argue that race has been used to prevent the working class from forming a unified opposition to capitalism. That is, by invoking racial distinctions, members of the ruling class have been able to “divide and conquer” the working class. Theorists within this tradition point to, among other things, the failed efforts of the Communist Party (USA) during the 1920s to unify the working class across race lines. These theorists argue that the privileges conferred upon whiteness provided working-class whites with an incentive to maintain divisions between themselves and working-class African Americans. Despite past failures to unify the working class, many Marxist scholars maintain that racial inequalities will disappear once society reaches a resolution to the question of class differences.

Another alternative to the essentialist view of race posits that race, as a term, has lost meaning. That is, given the confluence of factors that often co-occur with race (e.g., ethnicity, social class, religion), some suggest that it would be best to abandon the term and focus on more meaningful social distinctions. Proponents of this view often point to social class and ethnicity as possible alternatives. Others argue that, to move beyond the political baggage associated with race, society must abandon all references to it. Adherents to this perspective claim that society will be able to transition to a postracial society in which racial boundaries disappear only after it abandons the idea of race. This view, however, has been critiqued by some as utopian. That is, critics of this view suggest that society must first recognize race in order to overcome the historical legacy that has befallen those who are placed in the category of the racial other. The intensity of the debate over the importance of race as a social category suggests that race will continue to be a salient and politically meaningful concept well into the twenty-first century.

Racism

As was the case for race, the definition of racism is contested by scholars. While most agree that it has three common elements that can be thought of as necessary conditions, there is disagreement over what beyond these elements is sufficient to qualify as racism. One necessary element is categorically negative feelings toward members of a particular race—feelings of antagonism or prejudice on the basis of race, or the fear of racially different peoples (i.e., xenophobia). A second necessary element is, as a popular online dictionary puts it, the belief “that members of one race are intrinsically superior to members of other races.” A third necessary element focuses on the unequal treatment of individuals because of their race, including the practice of racial discrimination, segregation, abusive behavior, or persecution.

Others suggest, however, that to demonstrate racism, one must go beyond prejudice and discrimination. Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton’s oft-cited distinction between individual racism (individual whites acting against individual blacks) and institutional racism (acts by the total white community against the black community) leads them to a purpose-driven definition of racism: “the predication of decisions and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group” (1967). In Phyllis Katz and Dalmas Taylor’s (1988) more modest terms, racism represents the cumulative effects of individuals, institutions, and cultures that result in the oppression of ethnic minorities. Andrew Hacker (1992) similarly focuses on effects rather than intent when describing institutional racism in terms of the consequences of biased white institutions that discriminate—sometimes subtly and sometimes blatantly—based on the belief that the racialized other is inherently inferior.

This dispersion of definitions of racism has led some to believe that the term is overused and perhaps therefore no longer useful. Others argue for limiting its use to the most extreme cases and allowing broader terms like prejudice, discrimination, and xenophobia to cover the more standard occurrences of intergroup conflict. Accordingly, the historian George Frederickson (2002) limits his definition of racism to a particularly extreme set of cases. According to him, racism is much less common than simple prejudice or xenophobia, which are nearly ubiquitous in human societies. To qualify as racism, three additional elements are required. First, racism is based on the belief that the stigmatized group possesses innate and unchangeable characteristics. Second, the goal of racism is to establish a permanent group-based hierarchy. Finally, racism entails an ideology that justifies practices that are used to maintain the racial order.

In Frederickson’s view, the earliest anticipation of modern racism was the treatment of Jewish converts to Christianity in late medieval Spain. Enmity toward the newly converted targeted their unchangeable Jewish bloodlines rather than their changeable religious beliefs. Similarly, nineteenth African American slaves were thought to have been victims of “the curse of Ham,” which forever poisoned their blood and doomed them to inferiority, even if they converted to Christianity. To German Nazis, Jews also had poisoned blood, which they believed threatened the Aryan race with sexual pollution and impurity.

Important disciplinary differences exist in the definition of racism. Historians and sociologists tend to prefer that racism be defined as having characteristics that extend beyond simple xenophobia. Social psychologists, however, tend to use the term interchangeably with prejudice. For example, John Dovidio and Samuel Gaertner’s oft-cited collection of the major different versions of racism identified by social psychologists cites nine versions of racism in its index, eight of which refer to individual prejudice in the sense used above (1986).

Social Psychology Of Racism

The usual sociopsychological approach to racism begins with the cognitive act of categorizing individuals into groups. At the most basic level, the sociologist William Graham Sumner (1906) suggested that people naturally perceive groups as ingroups to which the perceiver belongs and outgroups composed of individuals categorized differently than the perceiver.

This distinction is alluring but perhaps too simplistic. Any individual belongs to multiple ingroups, whether based on family, nation, race, religion, neighborhood, or a host of other dimensions. Likewise, there are many groups to which any individual does not belong. As social identity theory suggests, research demonstrates that perceptions of ingroups and outgroups are heavily influenced by momentary social contexts. In the context of a war, one’s own national identity is salient, as is the national identity of the enemy; this is generally not the case in the context of a trip to the supermarket. Second, there is no simple relationship between evaluations of ingroups and outgroups. Sometimes ingroups are evaluated positively, and the corresponding outgroup, negatively. But sometimes people of all groups, members and nonmembers alike, evaluate a low status group negatively and a high status group positively. And third, all definitions of racism assume that it centers on race, which historically has focused on skin color. But race often is confounded with other dimensions of difference between people, such as social class, occupation, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. In Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, Shylock was not only a Jew but a loan shark. Race is rarely a clean concept.

Racism requires more than categorization and negative affect toward groups that are perceived as different. It requires a belief system or ideology. The scientific racialism that emerged during the nineteenth century is a premier example of such a belief system. This belief postulated a finite number of biologically distinctive races in human societies, of which the

European races, especially northern Europeans, were blessed with the most superior attributes. In the United States, scientific racialism had at least three significant practical consequences. First, it provided an ideological foundation for the post slavery Jim Crow system that emerged after the Civil War (1861–1865). Second, it led to the eugenics movement that urged limiting the reproduction of “inferior” races. Third, it was used in the United States during the 1920s to justify preferential quotas that favored immigration from nations with supposedly superior racial stocks.

Changing Forms Of Racism

The latter half of the twentieth century led to major changes in human societies’ treatment of race, triggered by the extreme anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany. In the United States, old-fashioned or Jim Crow racism was common among whites before World War II (1939–1945). Its core beliefs concerned blacks’ alleged inherent intellectual inferiority and was used to support formal racial discrimination and segregation. After World War II, support for such views diminished sharply and, by the end of the century, was almost gone. Support declined earliest among the college-educated and younger whites, findings usually interpreted as reflecting their greater enlightenment. Support eroded more slowly among whites living in the South, presumably because of its long cultural history of formally subordinating African Americans.

Numerous scholars have argued that other forms of racism have since taken the place of Jim Crow racism. Several of these new forms of racism are specific to the political domain: symbolic racism, modern racism, and racial resentment. In Europe, a parallel distinction has been made between blatant prejudice and subtle prejudice. Other forms of racism have been applied to interpersonal relationships, such as aversive racism or ambivalent racism. All these newer forms of racism share the view that whites accept the general principles of racial equality, but continue to harbor negative feelings toward blacks. Both the old and new forms of racism have generally been measured with surveys or other questionnaires, using items such as how much discrimination against blacks the individual believes continues to exist, how strong blacks’ work ethics are, and so on. Some controversy exists about how distinctive the new racism is from the old racism, however, with some scholars claiming they share common elements (e.g., the stereotype that blacks have a weak work ethic).

The new racism has been described as having a wide variety of effects. In politics, it contributes to opposition to black candidates and to support for white candidates who are thought to be racially biased. It also contributes to opposition to racially targeted liberal policies, such as government-enforced school integration or affirmative action. It also contributes to a wide variety of other conservative attitudes on dimensions that have no manifest link to race, such as party identification or political ideology, or policy preferences concerning welfare, crime, or tax policies. In the interpersonal realm, it contributes to avoidance of minorities when avoidance can be attributed to nonracial factors.

Four contemporary alternatives to the idea of the new racisms should be noted. One is an implicit form of prejudice that is largely automatic, unconscious, and uncontrollable. This has been measured with a variety of indirect techniques that do not involve questionnaires, and so is arguably less prone to social desirability biases. Implicit prejudice may emerge in more unguarded forms of behavior, such as eye contact or nonverbal behavior, whereas the new racisms may be most influential in deliberate behaviors, such as choice of a presidential candidate.

A second alternative challenges the specificity of the new racisms to a single stigmatized racial group such as African Americans. Instead, they may emerge from generalized ethnocentrism involving both antagonism toward a variety of lower-status minority groups and excessive valuation of one’s own high-status racial in-group.

A third alternative challenges the notion of the new racisms on the grounds that they really reflect political conservatism rather than racial antagonism. This point of view has been generally discredited by evidence that the new racisms and their effects, though correlated with ideological conservatism, are only explained by it to a modest degree. There also is evidence that ideological divisions in the United States have themselves increasingly reflected racial attitudes, rather than vice versa.

A final challenge comes from those who believe that the new racisms are a product of dominant racial groups’ sense of threat from subordinate groups and their efforts to protect the existing racial hierarchy. Social dominance theory, sense of group position theory, and color-blind racism theory all posit fixed racial hierarchies of power, status, and resources; dominant groups’ efforts to protect their privileged positions; and the construction of ideologies that legitimate the hierarchy and deflect attention from its essentially racial nature. For example, the Protestant work ethic asserts that beneficial outcomes should, and do, come primarily to those who work hard and persevere. Because stigmatized racial groups often are alleged to have weak work ethics, their lesser accomplishments are blamed often on their own lack of effort rather than on their race. These theories are also often skeptical of the lower levels of racism expressed by the better educated, as their more tolerant views may merely reflect their superior knowledge of conventional social norms against blatantly racist expressions. Regardless of one’s position in this debate, most scholars confer that racism will continue to have a substantial influence on politics in the years to come.

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