Theory Of Collective Action Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

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Collective action theory attempts to address the problematic and uncertain character of individual participation in collective or collaborative efforts, especially those directed toward the provision of public goods such as social movements and political organizations. The foundational text of collective action theory is The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965) by economist Mancur Olson. Collective action theory radically transformed studies of collective behavior by shifting the emphasis away from notions of irrational group instincts, mass agitation, or emotional spontaneity and toward the rational decision-making processes of participants.

The fundamentals of neoclassical economics inform Olson’s work. In Olson’s view, social undertakings arise from the choices of rational individuals. Individuals decide to partake in collective action primarily to maximize personal benefits while minimizing personal costs.

One primary problem facing theorists of collective activity is that collective action poses costs for the actor. Even more problematic, however, is the fact that collectively gained rewards are not divisible. Thus, no direct correspondence exists between the individual costs that one might incur by engaging in collective activity and the rewards that one might receive as a result of such action. A worker who refuses to join a union in the workplace will still be rewarded by a wage increase won by the union, if that worker’s job falls within the bargaining unit in question. Because the individual collective member receives the collective rewards gained by group action, even if contributing nothing personally to the effort, rational choice theory would suggest that one would be likely to free ride on the efforts of others. Thus, for collective action theory, the issue of the free rider, who accepts the rewards of group membership without taking any of the risks involved in winning those rewards, becomes central.

For Olson, individuals are encouraged to act collectively where groups control and distribute selective incentives. Those who do not join the collective effort or contribute actively to achieve collective interests can be treated differently from those who do.

This raises some important considerations for political organizers. It is not enough to appeal to collective interests, values, or group goals to encourage people to engage in collective activity. Mobilizing people on collective actions, such as social movements, requires that the movement organizations be in a position to control rewards and distribute them selectively on the basis of participation. Mobilization is unlikely to occur in the absence of selective incentives, even where common interests are present. At the same time, the danger of undemocratic practices emerges where a minority that comes to control a preponderance of selective incentives comes to dominate the group’s majority.

Olson’s publication also provided the starting point for resource mobilization (RM) theories that have become the dominant perspective on social movements within American sociology. RM theorists have modified Olson’s approach to lessen the individualist emphasis in favor of an analysis of organizational decision making and repertoires of action. Contemporary RM theorists have also looked more closely at emotional and cultural, rather than simply material, aspects of collective action.

Bibliography:

McCarthy, J. D., and M. N. Zald, eds. The Dynamics of Social Movements. Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop, 1977.
Oberschall, Anthony. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.
Zald, M., and J. D. McCarthy, eds. . Social Movements in an Organizational Society. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1987.