A think tank is a nonprofit, independent, public policy research institute. This ver y broad definition encompasses diverse organizations in terms of resources, personnel, and specialization. However, they all apply a model of expertise—using social science methods of inquiry to study public issues in order to give policy insights and advice to government and lawmakers and to educate the general public.

Originally, think tanks resembled “universities without students” (Weaver 1989). They employ experts with strong academic backgrounds and seek to convey an image of neutrality by following higher education norms of scientific rigorousness and objectivity. Over time, the work of think tanks has become more politicized, and some of them have tried to market their ideas through sophisticated advocacy strategies. The think tank model of expertise can now be encountered worldwide.

In the United States, think tanks are generally registered as 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, which grants them exemption from federal income tax and allows them to collect tax-deductible donations. This generous status can be a double-edged sword: Helping them gain access to funds was instrumental to their development. However, it also restricted their actions because it forbade them from conducting political campaign activities to influence elections and prevented them from dedicating a substantial part of their activity to lobbying.

Some aspects of the U.S. political system are believed to have contributed to the emergence and growth of think tanks. Political features credited for the dynamism of the think tank in the United States include: a fiscal status favorable for securing financing for their operations, the openness of the country’s legislative process, the expansion of the federal government and government contracts for research opportunities, the weakness of political parties agenda-setting capabilities, and the need for readily available government positions.

Historical Development

The establishment of independent research institutes in the United States links closely with the professionalization of social sciences and traces back to the turn of the twentieth century. At a time when state bureaucracy was growing, independent research organizations were founded with the progressive idea that scientific analysis was the best way to promote efficiency in government. The Institute for Government Research (IGR), chartered in 1916, was one of the first organizations to produce this type of independent expertise for advancing governmental reform. Under the auspices of its chairman, Frank Good now, and its first director, William Willoughby, both renowned political scientists, the IGR was particularly influential in the establishment of an annual federal budget. In 1927, the IGR became the Brookings Institution.

Several progressive or liberal organizations followed suit in the first half of the twentieth century. In 1943, a group of businessmen, disgruntled by the New Deal and what they perceived as a liberal consensus, establish the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) to promote conservative principals under the same model of scholarly policy analysis and public education that Brookings had developed.

After World War II (1939–1945), the RAND Corporation— formerly a branch of Douglas Aircraft that provided research for the U.S. Air Force—gained its autonomy and popularized the term think tank, which the military had coined. RAND was the first organization that derived almost all its revenues from government contracts. From its original focus on defense strategies in response to the cold war, RAND expanded—on account of a substantial budget—to pursue a very broad range of research. Among its many accomplishments, the organization is credited with major breakthroughs in game theory. The Urban Institute, created in 1968 by the administration of U.S. president Lyndon Johnson to provide expert evaluation of the Great Society programs, is another organization whose research is primarily contracted by U.S. government agencies.

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the rise of new think tanks that criticized the more neutral approach of their predecessors and decided to more forcefully assert their ideological standpoints. Founded in 1963 by two former members of the Kennedy administration who disapproved of the foreign policy pursued by the government, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) defends left-wing policy analysis, seeking to combine with social activism. During the 1960s, IPS was particularly engaged in the civil rights movement and opposition to the Vietnam War (1959–1975).

Edwin Feulner and Paul Weyrich established the Heritage Foundation in 1973 to promote conservative ideas in more activist ways than AEI. Heritage brought a new “think tank culture” based on aggressive marketing of proposals that started what was described as a “war of ideas.” Heritage asserted its influence in 1980 when it provided the newly elected President Reagan with its Mandate for Leadership, a study containing two thousand recommendations for furthering a conservative agenda. During the 1980s and 1990s, fueled by generous conservative foundations, conservative and libertarian think tanks like the Cato Institute flourished.

The Center for American Progress (CAP), created in 2003, is considered the liberal answer to the Heritage Foundation. Its funding came from a group of wealthy liberals headed by George Soros, who attributed part of the success conservatives enjoyed at the time to their strong presence in the think tank world. In order to advocate its ideals, CAP joined forces with a 501(c)(4) organization to gain more leeway for active lobbying.

Role And Influence

Think tanks’ direct impact on policy making is difficult to gauge. They are credited not only with a direct, measurable effect on specific decisions, but also with shaping what is known as the climate of the opinion, or the decision-making environment.

The role of think tanks is controversial because their involvement within the policy elite demonstrates the intricate relationship between knowledge and power. While some critics have denounced them as discourse conveyors for the dominant political and economic players, others praise them for helping democratize developing countries.

The intense politicization of some think tanks might be detrimental to the credibility and influence of research institutes because it damages their reputation for objective expertise. Nonetheless, a worldwide boom in think tanks has accompanied their increasing advocacy.

Bibliography:

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Third-Party Intervention

Third-party intervention can be defined as the coercive or cooperative intercession of an external actor into the affairs of a sovereign state in order to influence the outcome of an internal conflict. Third parties are nonparticipants in the primary conflict and may be individuals, state governments, international organizations, or regional associations; they may be unilateral, consisting of one main actor, or multilateral, consisting of multiple actors. The interventions themselves can be classified according to the role they play in managing the conflict. Thus, conflict prevention aims to resolve internal tensions before they lead to violence, conflict resolution is designed to persuade the combatants to halt an ongoing conflict, and post conflict reconstruction seeks to consolidate a newly brokered settlement in order to prevent the reemergence of hostilities. These interventions can take place simultaneously or consecutively, involving one or more third parties working separately or in concert.

In undertaking the intervention itself, third parties can choose between cooperative instruments, which require the agreement of the principal combatants, and coercive instruments, which do not require the consent of the combatants. The former includes technical and legal assistance; the provision of mediation or arbitration services; and “carrots” such as aid, loan guarantees, and membership in valued organizations. There is growing scholarly interest in the effectiveness of such incentives—sometimes called political conditionality—in inducing governments to adopt prominority policies, thereby reducing the risk of internal conflict. Third parties may also help to socialize governments into adopting the policies that promote interethnic peace.

In coercive interventions, powerful third parties use “sticks” to influence the outcome of the conflict. Rather than merely denying benefits such as European Union membership, trade preferences, or economic assistance, coercive instruments work by imposing costs on target governments until they adopt the desired behavior. These instruments include economic sanctions, logistical or financial support to one side of the conflict, and outright military intervention. Cooperative instruments are widely believed to be more desirable for conflict prevention, whereas coercive instruments are generally reserved for conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction.

Much has been written about the motives of third-party interventions. A classic realist or instrumentalist prediction is that states intervene when intervention serves their economic or security interests. Another possibility is that politicians intervene when they expect to achieve success, thereby scoring an easy political victory. A domestic politics explanation holds that states intervene in conflicts when there are perceived ethnic ties between an important domestic constituency in the intervening state and one side of the conflict. This ethnic ties argument has also been used to explain the intervention of a state on the side of its ethnic brethren in a bid to “rescue” them when they face a repressive ethnic majority. However, quantitative analysis has shown that homeland states are no more likely to intervene on behalf of their coethnics when they are repressed than when they are not. Ethnic conflict in one state may also weaken state structures to the point that it invites outside intervention by states seeking to profit from internal struggles. Interestingly, states facing their own conflicts are actually more likely to act aggressively than they are to be victimized.

A relatively new field of research concerns the determinants of successful intervention. Some scholars contend that helping the stronger side to win is the surest and fastest way to end violent conflict. However, others believe that third parties can best reduce the level of carnage by intervening against the perpetrators of atrocities—generally the more powerful side. There is also some debate over the role of third-party bias in intervention success. Some argue that interveners with a significant stake in the outcome of a conflict might be better able to commit to enforcing a peace settlement, at which point both parties feel safe enough to disarm. But others disagree, arguing that both parties must believe that the intervener does not have a stake in the conflict; otherwise, they cannot trust that the terms of the agreement will be enforced. This usually requires credible external security guarantees to both sides of the conflict. Data analysis shows that long-lasting peacekeeping institutions, such as demilitarized zones and dispute resolution commissions, tend to decrease the level of uncertainty for both parties and enhance the durability of peace settlements.

Bibliography:

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