Third-Party Intervention Essay ⋆ Political Science Essay Examples ⋆ EssayEmpire

Third-party intervention can be defined as the coercive or cooperative intercession of an external actor into the affairs of a sovereign state in order to influence the outcome of an internal conflict. Third parties are nonparticipants in the primary conflict and may be individuals, state governments, international organizations, or regional associations; they may be unilateral, consisting of one main actor, or multilateral, consisting of multiple actors. The interventions themselves can be classified according to the role they play in managing the conflict. Thus, conflict prevention aims to resolve internal tensions before they lead to violence, conflict resolution is designed to persuade the combatants to halt an ongoing conflict, and post conflict reconstruction seeks to consolidate a newly brokered settlement in order to prevent the reemergence of hostilities. These interventions can take place simultaneously or consecutively, involving one or more third parties working separately or in concert.

In undertaking the intervention itself, third parties can choose between cooperative instruments, which require the agreement of the principal combatants, and coercive instruments, which do not require the consent of the combatants. The former includes technical and legal assistance; the provision of mediation or arbitration services; and “carrots” such as aid, loan guarantees, and membership in valued organizations. There is growing scholarly interest in the effectiveness of such incentives—sometimes called political conditionality—in inducing governments to adopt prominority policies, thereby reducing the risk of internal conflict. Third parties may also help to socialize governments into adopting the policies that promote interethnic peace.

In coercive interventions, powerful third parties use “sticks” to influence the outcome of the conflict. Rather than merely denying benefits such as European Union membership, trade preferences, or economic assistance, coercive instruments work by imposing costs on target governments until they adopt the desired behavior. These instruments include economic sanctions, logistical or financial support to one side of the conflict, and outright military intervention. Cooperative instruments are widely believed to be more desirable for conflict prevention, whereas coercive instruments are generally reserved for conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction.

Much has been written about the motives of third-party interventions. A classic realist or instrumentalist prediction is that states intervene when intervention serves their economic or security interests. Another possibility is that politicians intervene when they expect to achieve success, thereby scoring an easy political victory. A domestic politics explanation holds that states intervene in conflicts when there are perceived ethnic ties between an important domestic constituency in the intervening state and one side of the conflict. This ethnic ties argument has also been used to explain the intervention of a state on the side of its ethnic brethren in a bid to “rescue” them when they face a repressive ethnic majority. However, quantitative analysis has shown that homeland states are no more likely to intervene on behalf of their coethnics when they are repressed than when they are not. Ethnic conflict in one state may also weaken state structures to the point that it invites outside intervention by states seeking to profit from internal struggles. Interestingly, states facing their own conflicts are actually more likely to act aggressively than they are to be victimized.

A relatively new field of research concerns the determinants of successful intervention. Some scholars contend that helping the stronger side to win is the surest and fastest way to end violent conflict. However, others believe that third parties can best reduce the level of carnage by intervening against the perpetrators of atrocities—generally the more powerful side. There is also some debate over the role of third-party bias in intervention success. Some argue that interveners with a significant stake in the outcome of a conflict might be better able to commit to enforcing a peace settlement, at which point both parties feel safe enough to disarm. But others disagree, arguing that both parties must believe that the intervener does not have a stake in the conflict; otherwise, they cannot trust that the terms of the agreement will be enforced. This usually requires credible external security guarantees to both sides of the conflict. Data analysis shows that long-lasting peacekeeping institutions, such as demilitarized zones and dispute resolution commissions, tend to decrease the level of uncertainty for both parties and enhance the durability of peace settlements.

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